Hastings Law Journal
Volume 72

Issue 1

Article 2

11-2020

Corporate Technologies and the Tech Nirvana Fallacy
Luca Enriques
Dirk A. Zetzsche

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Luca Enriques and Dirk A. Zetzsche, Corporate Technologies and the Tech Nirvana Fallacy, 72 HASTINGS
L.J. 55 (2020).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol72/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Corporate Technologies and the Tech Nirvana
Fallacy
LUCA ENRIQUES† & DIRK A. ZETZSCHE†
This Article introduces the term Corporate Technologies (“CorpTech”) to refer to the use of
distributed ledgers, smart contracts, Big Data analytics, artificial intelligence and machine
learning in the corporate context and analyzes the impact of CorpTech on the future of corporate
boards. We focus on the tech manifestation of agency problems within corporations and
identify—after considering possible market, governance, and regulatory solutions—elements of
a governance framework for the CorpTech age. In particular, we take on a prediction often found
in the literature, namely that CorpTech has the potential to solve a number of corporate
governance problems for good and even make boards of directors redundant. We argue that this
claim is based on what we call the “tech nirvana fallacy,” or the tendency of comparing
supposedly perfect machines with failure-prone humans. The inherent features of technology and
corporate governance reveal that even well-programmed CorpTech leaves the core issue of
corporate governance—conflicts of interest among the relevant corporate stakeholders—
untouched. In the Corptech age, the key question becomes: “is the human being that selects or
controls the firm’s tech conflicted?” If so, CorpTech itself will be tainted. In fact, the problems
arising from the transition to a CorpTech-dominated governance environment may, in the shortterm, make things even worse: insufficient understanding of the promise and perils of CorpTech
and over-confidence therein may even aggravate agency problems within firms.
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INTRODUCTION
In one of the largest financial scandals to date, Wells Fargo, the United
States’ largest bank by number of employees, admitted to the opening of some
3.5 million deposit and credit card accounts without consumer knowledge,
leading to fabricated quarterly earnings and a boost to the Wells Fargo stock
price. The scandal resulted in a dozen U.S. Senate and House Committee
hearings, various U.S. and state regulators’ inquiries, penalties and fines
exceeding $4.5 billion in total costs to date, an unprecedented “asset cap”
imposed on Wells Fargo in early 2018 for “widespread consumer abuses,” a
fundamental revamp of Wells Fargo’s compensation, compliance and riskmanagement system, forfeiture of CEO pay, and the departure of several
executives, including three CEOs within three years.1 The Wells Fargo scandal
is the latest reminder of how, almost ninety years after Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means’s seminal book The Modern Corporation and Private Property,2 the
mechanisms to ensure that agents within corporations perform their tasks and
duties in line with the long-term interests of their shareholders (and other
stakeholders, as the case may be3), rather than pursuing their immediate selfinterest, are far from fail-proof.4
If laws, best practices, ethical standards, and market pressures have so far
been unable to tackle this core corporate governance challenge, perhaps
1. See Press Release, Josh Shapiro, Att’y Gen., Off. of the Att’y Gen., Commonwealth of Pa., Attorney
General Shapiro Announces $57 Million 50-State Settlement with Wells Fargo for Opening Unauthorized
Accounts and Charging Consumers for Unnecessary Auto Insurance, Mortgage Fees (Dec. 28, 2018),
https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/press-releases/attorney-general-shapiro-announces-575million-50-state-settlement-with-wells-fargo-bank-for-opening-unauthorized-accounts-and-chargingconsumers-for-unnecessary-auto-insurance-mortgage-fees/ (detailing misconduct sanctioned as well as
penalties, fines and settlement costs until end of 2018 of $ 3 billion); see also Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Takes
$1.6 Billion Hit Linked to Fake-Account Scandal, CNN (Oct. 15, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/
10/15/investing/wells-fargo-earnings-scandal/index.html (detailing additional inquiries, sanctions and penalties
through Oct. 25, 2019).
2. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1933).
3. While the prevailing U.S. corporate governance view has long expected management to focus on
wealth creation for shareholders only, things have changed in recent years, as shown, for instance, by the letter
from Larry Fink, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the world’s largest asset manager, Blackrock, to the
CEOs of U.S. listed companies. Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman and CEO, BlackRock, to CEOs (2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (“To prosper over time,
every company must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution
to society. Companies must benefit all of their stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, and
the communities in which they operate.”). Multistakeholderism may be understood as the new mainstream. Yet,
we will mainly keep our focus here on shareholders for two reasons. First, they are a key constituency with a
well-established role in companies’ internal governance, given their (hitherto exclusive) power to appoint
directors. Second, while not undisputed, the principle under Delaware law is that directors, in the words of Leo
Strine, former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, have a “legal obligation to make—within the
constraints of other positive law—the promotion of stockholder welfare their end.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., The
Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure
Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 764 (2015).
4. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 passim (1976) (outlining the concept of managerial agency
costs and their implications for corporate governance).
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technology can. Would algorithms and machines, with their more powerful,
disinterested, and unbiased information-processing capacity, be better at
monitoring corporate agents?
Breathtaking advancements in information technology (IT) are
characterizing the twenty-first century, from big data analytics,5 artificial
intelligence (AI), and machine learning6 to distributed ledger technology,
including blockchains7 and smart contracts.8 Many expect these technologies,
which we collectively refer to as “CorpTech,” to prompt fundamental changes
in the law9 as well as in corporate governance.10
CorpTech comprises all solutions relating to corporate governance,
including tools to set executive compensation, identify candidates for top
positions within the organization, facilitate investor relations, corporate voting,
and the internal workings of the board of directors, manage risk, and enhance
compliance functions.11 However, as used here, the term does not extend to
operations software products such as those used for sales, research and
development (R&D), and production management.12
With regard to corporate governance, scholars have speculated as to the
possible use of the new technologies to improve discrete corporate practices,
such as shareholder identification,13 shareholder proposals, proxy fights,14
electronic voting, virtual shareholder meetings,15 digitalized compliance and
5. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671,
677–93 (2016) (describing big data analytics).
6. See, e.g., Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 U. WASH. L. REV. 87, 102–10 (2014)
(discussing progress on AI research and how it may affect the practice of the law).
7. See, e.g., Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley & Douglas W. Arner, The Distributed Liability of
Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain, U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1370–74 (2018) (introducing the concept
of distributed ledgers); PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF
CODE 13–57 (2018) (describing blockchains).
8. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Comment, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 263, 273–78 (2017) (analyzing features of smart contracts); see also Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell,
Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 320–24, 367–81 (2017) (describing smart contracts).
9. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977,
1043–52 (2015) (arguing that securities regulation must be adapted to FinTech).
10. See infra Part II.
11. CorpTech differs from RegTech. The latter is the use of technology in the context of risk management,
compliance, reporting, and regulatory oversight. It thus overlaps with CorpTech only in part—in other words,
in its component relating to risk management oversight and compliance. See, e.g., Douglas W. Arner, Jànos
Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 377–84 (2017).
12. Importantly, though, the boundaries between CorpTech and operations technology will necessarily be
hazy, since effective CorpTech requires integration into the rest of a firm’s information systems. For instance,
in the Wells Fargo case, the fraud originated in the bank’s retail sales department. See supra note 1 and
accompanying text. Effective CorpTech oversight would have required access to fraud indicators available only
on the operations level.
13. See, e.g., George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 238–53
(2018); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 219, 224 (allowing for the use of the blockchain to maintain corporate
share registries).
14. See, e.g., Geis, supra note 13, at 272–73.
15. See, e.g., Michael D. Goldman & Eileen M. Filliben, Corporate Governance: Current Trends and
Likely Developments for the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 689, 695 (2000); Anne Lafarre &

60

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:55

risk management,16 as well as to the impact of these new technologies on the
corporate purpose.17 Attention has also been focused on an arguably fringe
phenomenon, algorithmic entities, or “self-driving corporations,” whereby
humans relinquish control over the corporation to an algorithm.18 Others have
delved into discrete legal questions arising from the use of AI to assist, if not
replace, boards in their decision-making functions,19 and into the related
question of whether algorithms may themselves (and should be allowed to) serve
as board members.20
Still others have speculated as to how new technologies will reshape
corporate governance more broadly. These scholars, whom we refer to as “tech
proponents,” share the view that technology will fundamentally change existing
corporate governance paradigms and may even eradicate long-standing
corporate governance problems.21 From their perspective, technology is the
solution to the ultimate challenge in corporate governance, namely, how to deal
with the inherent imperfections of (human) corporate agents, including their
dogged self-interestedness and pervasive biases.22 Multiple corporate scandals

Christoph Van der Elst, Blockchain Technology for Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism 15 (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 390/2018, 2018); Christoph Van der Elst & Anne Lafarre,
Blockchain and Smart Contracting for the Shareholder Community, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 111, 128 (2019);
Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards, Distributed Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L.
REV. ONLINE 1, 18–19 (2017).
16. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age,
88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 722–38 (2010) (discussing the governance implications of digitalized compliance and risk
management).
17. See, e.g., Christopher Bruner, Distributed Ledgers, Artificial Intelligence, and the Purpose of the
Corporation, CAMBRIDGE L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 19) (on file with authors) (arguing that the
core issues of corporate purpose remain unchanged by technology).
18. See Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW.
U. L. REV. 1485, 1495–1500 (2014) (discussing algorithmic entities, corporations with no members, no directors
and running merely on software); Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 901–06
(2018) (discussing the perils of algorithmic entities); see also John Armour & Horst Eidenmüller, Self-Driving
Corporations?, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 87, 105–14 (2020) (developing a conceptual framework for self-driving
corporations and highlighting regulatory challenges).
19. See Max Bankewitz, Carl Åberg & Christine Teuchert, Digitalization and Boards of Directors: A New
Era of Corporate Governance?, 5 BUS. & MGMT. RSCH. 58, 63–64 (2016) (predicting that, under the influence
of digitalization, boards will become “virtual networks of people” with diminished needs to monitor
management).
20. See Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Artificial Agents in Corporate Boardrooms, 105 CORNELL L. REV.
869, 892–902 (2020) (discussing AI algorithms taking the functions of board members under Delaware law and
arguing that the Roman law for slaves may offer a model for its legal treatment); Martin Petrin, Corporate
Management in the Age of AI, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 965, 1002–06 (predicting the advent of AI directors).
This is of course part of the broader debate on humans’ race against the machines. See generally ANDREW
MCAFEE & ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE (2011) (detailing the replacement of human
labor by computers); Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible
Are Jobs to Computerisation?, 114 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254 (2017) (making predictions about
the same).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See, for example, Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 237, 248–85 (2009) with specific reference to the corporate board setting.
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(from Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s23 to Wells Fargo24) bear
testimony to the pernicious consequences that the wrong corporate governance
arrangements can have on shareholders and other stakeholders alike. If
automated solutions become available that will finally keep corporate agents on
a tight leash without unduly constraining their ability to create value, then we
might be on the verge of a new era in which corporations, liberated from the
negative influence of agent opportunism, can become even more formidable
engines for growth and prosperity.
Tempting as it may be to set up perfect machines against failure-prone
humans (what we call the “tech nirvana fallacy”),25 a better understanding of
both the available technology and the enduring role of humans in its design and
deployment justifies a soberer assessment of technology’s impact on corporate
governance. In providing this assessment, our Article provides the conceptual
groundwork for a sound governance framework in an age where humans and
machines interact.
In order to do so, our Article argues that the conflicts of interest and
information asymmetries that have always characterized corporate governance
seep into the code of CorpTech applications. The allocation of power over the
selection of particular CorpTech solutions will determine the degree of control
that any constituency (directors, management, shareholders, and other
stakeholders) can exert over the firm. We also dismiss as unrealistic the idea that
shareholders (let alone other stakeholders) may disintermediate boards and
monitor management directly themselves. Boards will continue to perform their
core monitoring and mediation functions for the predictable future. Yet, we
acknowledge that CorpTech, and hence adaption of corporate governance to
CorpTech, is ever more important for the functioning of corporate boards.
On this basis, we lay out the pillars of a governance framework designed
to steer the cooperation between humans and machines in the CorpTech age:
boards should extend their monitoring functions by extending the remit of
existing committees to CorpTech oversight or by establishing tech committees
with the same task. We also make the case for mandatory disclosure of
CorpTech-related corporate governance arrangements.

23. In the Enron and WorldCom cases, executives had not only misled their boards of directors and audit
committees on high-risk accounting practices, but also successfully pressured their audit firm (soon-to-be
defunct Arthur Andersen) to ignore the issues. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule
Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 302 (2004); CURTIS J. MILHAUPT &
KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT L EGAL SYSTEMS AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD 47–67 (2008) (discussing the Enron scandal).
24. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
25. The nirvana fallacy refers to the misconception, common among legal scholars, of comparing the real
world, with its market imperfections, with a failproof, perfectly regulated one. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1272 (1982). The economist Harold Demsetz first
identified this fallacy, albeit without coining the term “nirvana fallacy” himself. Harold Demsetz, Information
and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1969) (introducing the “nirvana approach,”
described above, as being susceptible to three common fallacies: the grass is always greener fallacy, the fallacy
of the free lunch, and the people could be different fallacy).
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We conclude that, while CorpTech may speed up procedures and
governance practices may include a greater degree of code deployment and data
analytics, CorpTech will not make the corporate boards’ core functions obsolete,
barring technological breakthroughs that eventually displace human judgment
in corporate decision-making processes entirely. So long as humans yield
influence over the firm, the question of who decides what code is deployed and
what data is processed will be key, and traditional corporate governance
mechanisms will retain their core function of curbing agency problems within
the firm.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the technical context of
our analysis. Part II presents the tech proponents’ view that CorpTech solutions
will supplant the monitoring board, while shareholder direct involvement will
make the mediating board obsolete. Part III counters these claims, arguing that
conflicts of interest are bound to remain at the heart of corporate governance.
Who selects the CorpTech for the firm will determine whose interests CorpTech
products will cater to. Part IV develops the elements of a CorpTech-dominated
governance framework designed to address corporate governance challenges in
the CorpTech age. Part V concludes.

I. THE PROMISE OF CORPTECH
This Part briefly describes the technologies that are affecting, or are likely
to affect, the functions typically associated with corporate boards: distributed
ledgers, blockchains, and smart contracts (Part I.A); and big data analytics,
artificial intelligence, and machine learning (Part I.B).
A. DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS, BLOCKCHAINS, AND SMART CONTRACTS
1. The Technologies
A distributed ledger is “a database that is consensually shared and
synchronized across networks spread across multiple sites, institutions, or
geographies, allowing transactions to have [multiple private or] public
‘witnesses.’”26 The data sharing results in a sequential database distributed
across a network of servers all of which together function as a ledger.27
Distributed ledgers are characterized by an absence or minimal presence of
central administration and no centralized data storage. They are, hence,
“distributed,” in the sense that the authorization for the recording of a given
piece of information results from the software-driven interaction of multiple
participants. Coupled with cryptographic solutions, such features (decentrali26. OLIVER WYMAN, WORLD ECON. F., INNOVATION-DRIVEN CYBER-RISK TO CUSTOMER DATA IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES 6 (2017), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Cyber_Risk_to_Customer_Data.pdf.
27. DAVID MILLS, KATHY WANG, BRENDAN MALONE, ANJANA RAVI, JEFF MARQUARDT, CLINTON CHEN,
ANTON BADEV, TIMOTHY BREZINSKI, LINDA FAHY, KIMBERLEY LIAO, VANESSA KARGENIAN, MAX
ELLITHORPE, WENDY NG & MARIA BAIRD, FED. RSRV. BD., DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2016-095, DISTRIBUTED
LEDGER TECHNOLOGY IN PAYMENTS, CLEARING, AND SETTLEMENT 10–11 (2016), https://doi.org/10.
17016/FEDS.2016.095.
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zation and distribution across a network of computers) curtail the risk of data
manipulation, thereby solving the problem of trusting third parties—
specifically, data storage service providers.28
The modus operandi of distributed ledgers is best understood by
contrasting them with traditional electronic ledgers where data is stored under
the administration of a single entity. The latter entail a number of risks. First, if
the hardware where the register is “located” is destroyed, the information
contents and the authority to ascertain that they are correct are lost. Second, an
unfaithful administrator (or disloyal employees, as the case may be) may
manipulate the information stored in the register. Third, a cyber-attack may
result in manipulations and data losses.29
Distributed ledgers address these problems by raising the barrier for
manipulation. The underlying technology requires consensus of many data
storage points (“nodes”). If there are n nodes (instead of one concentrated
ledger) and e describes the effort necessary to break into any single server, all
other conditions being equal (safety per server etc.), the effort necessary to
manipulate all the linked servers will be n x e rather than 1 x e.
Distributed ledgers are usually paired with a blockchain protocol.30
Blockchain refers to the storage of all data parts as data bundles (the “blocks”)
in a strict time-related series which links each block, through a time stamp, to
the previous and subsequent blocks. The blockchain renders data corruption
even harder, because a successful cyberattack would require simultaneously
corrupting not just one, but multiple sets of data (that is, the whole blockchain)
as well as the time stamps.
Distributed ledgers have provided fertile ground for the application of
another innovation that may solve the problem of trust in human interactions:
smart contracts.31 While neither smart, nor contracts, they are in fact selfexecuting software protocols that reflect the terms of an agreement between two
parties.32 The conditions of the agreement are written directly into lines of code.
Smart contracts permit the execution of transactions between disparate,

28. See MICHÈLE FINCK, BLOCKCHAIN REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE 12–14 (2019); see also
Sinclair Davidson, Primavera De Filippi & Jason Potts, Blockchains and the Economic Institutions of
Capitalism, 14 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 639, 641 (2018) (arguing that blockchain technology is a new
governance institution that competes with other economic institutions of capitalism, namely firms, markets,
networks, and even governments); DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 55, 136–40 (arguing that widespread
deployment of the blockchain will lead to tech-based business practices that could prompt a loss in importance
of centralized authorities, such as government, and urging a more active regulatory approach).
29. Any server can be manipulated with sufficient computing power and time (even if no other weakness
in an encryption system is known to the attackers). See JEAN-PHILIPPE AUMASSON , SERIOUS CRYPTOGRAPHY: A
PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN ENCRYPTION 10–18, 40–48 (2018).
30. See, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 33–58; see also Zetzsche et al., supra note 7, at 1372.
31. See Sklaroff, supra note 8, at 272–75; see also Werbach & Cornell, supra note 8, at 332–33.
32. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Contracts, 43 J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2017);
Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE
35, 36 (2014); Karen E.C. Levy, Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts and the
Social Workings of Law, 3 ENGAGING SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 1, 5–6 (2017); Werbach & Cornell, supra note 8, at
313.
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anonymous parties without the need for an external enforcement mechanism
(such as a court, an arbitrator, or a central clearing facility). They render
transactions traceable, transparent, and irreversible. Since processes driven by
smart contracts are often saved on distributed ledgers, we refer to these three
technologies (distributed ledgers, blockchains, and smart contracts) collectively
as “distributed ledger technologies” (“DLTs”).
2. DLT-Based CorpTech Solutions
DLTs have the potential of altering the way companies are directed and
controlled.33 Notable experiments centering around shareholder voting support
this prediction. For instance, Fidelity Investments, the world’s fourth-largest
asset manager, has developed SOCOACT, a blockchain-based voting system
designed to authenticate voters and ensure fair corporate voting processes.34
Computershare, a provider of share-registers-as-a-service, tabulation services,
and technical vote processing at shareholder meetings, has teamed up with
SETL, a provider of blockchain-based central securities depositary services, in
an effort to establish the world’s first blockchain-based immutable register of
securities ownership.35 Broadridge, whose business includes managing the
information flows between the institutional investor holding the shares and the
issuer,36 obtained a patent to utilize the Ethereum blockchain for proxy voting
and share repurchases37 following a trial with J.P. Morgan, Northern Trust, and
Banco Santander.38
Similarly, Northern Trust, one of the largest and oldest U.S. banks, has
developed a blockchain solution for board meetings in cooperation with
technology giant IBM.39 The package includes two smart contracts that record
meeting attendance by collecting biometric information from the various devices

33. See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Niron Hashai, Eugene Kandel & Yishay Yafeh, Technological Progress and
the Future of the Corporation, 6 J. BRITISH ACAD. 215, 225 (2018) (arguing that, because DLTs reduce fraud
and enhance trust, they have the potential to displace “powerful intermediaries”). But see Iris H-Y Chiu & Ernest
W.K. Lim, Technology vs Ideology: How Far Will Artificial Intelligence and Distributed Ledger Technology
Transform Corporate Governance and Business?, 18 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (arguing that
DLT merely increases efficiency of corporate governance processes).
34. See U.S. Patent Pub. App. No. US 2017/0046689 A1 (filed July 14, 2016), http://appft.uspto.gov/
netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-bool.html&r=
15&f=G&l=50&co1=AND&d=PG01&s1=%22Crypto+Voting%22&OS=%22Crypto+Voting%22&RS=%22
Crypto+Voting%22.
35. See Press Release, SETL, Computershare and SETL Demonstrate Australia’s First Working
Blockchain Solution, https://www.setl.io/blog/computershare-and-setl-demonstrate-australia-s-first-workingblockchain-solution (Sept. 25, 2019).
36. On custodian chains, see, for example, Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of
Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1236–48 (2008).
37. Press Release, Broadridge, Broadridge Secures Industry-Leading Blockchain Patent for Proxy
Processing and Repo Agreements (May 10, 2018), https://www.broadridge.com/press-release/2018/broadridgesecures-industry-leading-blockchain-patent.
38. Pete Rizzo, Broadridge Completes Blockchain Proxy Voting Trial, COINDESK (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://www.coindesk.com/broadridge-blockchain-proxy-voting-jpmorgan-santander.
39. Christine Kim, Northern Trust Wins Patent for Storing Meeting Minutes on a Blockchain, COINDESK
(June 6, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/northern-trust-wins-patent-storing-meeting-minutes-blockchain.
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an attendee may carry and all other pertinent information about the meeting.40 It
also converts all such information into meeting minutes, following a
standardized format.41 A third smart contract posts the minutes of the meeting
and associated documents in a pre-determined repository.42 This allows meeting
attendance and individual contributions to be instantaneously stored in a
predetermined and searchable format.
Developments such as these have stimulated the tech proponents’
optimism that DLT applications could also tackle a particularly thorny area of
corporate governance: executive compensation. Specifically, smart contracts
could be used to make compensation arrangements harder to alter in
opportunistic ways further down the road, a phenomenon known as
“backdating.”43 More generally, it has been suggested that, instead of relying on
(potentially) conflicted compensation consultants and their own (often selfserving) biases,44 boards could use smart contracts to determine compensation
packages.45 To the best of our knowledge, though, there is no publicly available
evidence that any such product has yet been developed.
A. BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND MACHINE LEARNING
1. The Technologies
Big data analytics refers to the collection and processing of data sets that
are either too large or too complex for traditional data processing applications to
handle.46 Big data applications look at the bulk of data points and apply
advanced data analytics methods to detect unexpected correlations, test expected
correlations for causation, or determine the probability of a predefined pattern.47
AI assists in putting the big data gathered to good use by drawing
conclusions as to the probability of an event from prior knowledge of conditions
related to the event; the greater the volume of data, the more insightful and

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REV. FIN. 7, 8–9 (2017). For an account
of the option backdating scandal, see, for example, Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 858–64 (2008).
44. On the role of compensation consultants, compare Kevin J. Murphy & Tatiana Sandino, Executive Pay
and “Independent” Compensation Consultants, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 247, 247–62 (2010) (finding evidence for
higher recommended levels of CEO pay when executive compensation consultants “cross-sell” services, but also
(somewhat counterintuitively) that board pay is higher when consultants work for the board rather than for
executives), with Christopher S. Armstrong, Christopher D. Ittner & David F. Larcker, Corporate Governance,
Compensation Consultants, and CEO Pay Levels, 17 REV. ACCT. STUD. 322, 322–51 (2012) (finding that
differences in governance quality explain much of the higher pay in clients of compensation consultants, while
there is no support for claims that potentially “conflicted” consultants result in higher CEO pay).
45. Hamdani et al., supra note 33, at 229.
46. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 123–149 (2013).
47. See id. at 6.
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accurate the inferences drawn from them.48 The baseline of AI is a computer that
mimics human cognitive functions, such as “learning” and “problem solving.”49
Machine learning is a subset of AI that uses statistical, data-based methods to
progressively improve the performance of computers on a given task, without
humans reprogramming the computer system to achieve enhanced
performance.50 In practice, the learning is achieved through extensive “practice”
with multiple feedback rounds through which the machine is told whether it has
passed or failed a task.51
2. AI-Based CorpTech
Due to their superior performance in data gathering and processing, big
data analytics, AI, and machine learning (hereinafter, referred to together as
“AI”) can be expected to affect all operational as well as internal control matters,
from strategy setting to risk management and compliance.52 While humans tend
to use core, salient data for decisions, technology can consider also seemingly
unrelated data.
Importantly for risk management, as humans tend to forget, technology can
handle data of the past as effectively as data of the present. To the extent that
accessibility of data of the past by humans (that is, memory) declines,
management of the risk related to those data unduly becomes of secondary
importance.
AI-based early detection and subsequent mitigation of non-compliance
should prove particularly valuable in reducing liabilities, penalties, and fines,
the magnitude of which has starkly increased in the last decade.53

48. See STUART J. RUSSEL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 495–99
(photo. reprt. 2016) (3d ed. 2009).
49. Id. at viii, 1–4 (defining AI as devices that perceive their environment and take actions that maximize
their chances of successfully achieving their task and describing the origin of the term AI in the Turing Test
where “a computer passes the test if a human interrogator, after posing some written questions, cannot tell
whether the written responses come from a person or from a computer,” and defining six core capabilities that
together compose most of AI, including natural language processing, knowledge representation, automated
reasoning, machine learning, computer vision, and robotics). The seminal work on AI is, of course, A.M. Turing,
Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433 (1950).
50. RUSSEL & NORVIG, supra note 48, at 693–859 (describing the training methods).
51. Id. at 495–99.
52. See Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 99 (while “strategic questions considered at the C-suite
level” are unlikely to justify machine learning analysis, given the insufficiency of available data, “external
generic data can be used to assist in scenario planning”); see also Saqib Aziz & Michael Dowling, Machine
Learning and AI for Risk Management, in DISRUPTING FINANCE: FINTECH AND STRATEGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
33, 34 (Theo Lynn, John G. Mooney, Pierangelo Rosati & Mark Cummins eds., 2019) (risk management);
Bamberger, supra note 16, at 690–93, 701–02 (compliance).
53. For instance, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission has approved a fine of approximately $5 billion
against Facebook for mishandling users’ personal information. Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Approves Facebook Fine
of About $5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/technology/facebookftc-fine.html. In 2017, German car manufacturer Volkswagen admitted to having manipulated emissions data
for cars manufactured for the U.S. markets, resulting, so far, in penalties and damages of $19 billion. See Press
Release, DOJ, Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal and Civil Penalties; Six
Volkswagen Executives and Employees Are Indicted in Connection with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions
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Technology is also said to be unbiased,54 albeit in the limited sense that
technology does not follow its own agenda and is not itself subject to humans’
cognitive biases.55 In particular, by airing unconventional and (fact-based)
contrarian views, machines could neutralize two related group dynamics that
seriously hamper boards’ effectiveness, namely, “groupthink”56 and the strong
social pressure against the expression of dissent in boardrooms.57
An oft-cited example of the early adoption of AI to improve board
decision-making dynamics involved Hong Kong-based venture capital firm
Deep Knowledge Ventures, which assigned a (sort of) board position to an AI
software named VITAL.58 VITAL is designed to conduct due diligence on
potential investments with a view to identifying overhyped projects, thereby
protecting the firm from investing in trendy, but overpriced, startups.59
Better use of internal and external data will also improve intra-firm
monitoring, which in turn should result in reduced agency costs60 and allow for
flatter organizational structures.61
In particular, AI and big data analytics could improve the design and
steering effects of compensation packages. Equilar Inc., a provider of tech
solutions for board recruiting, executive compensation, and shareholder
engagement, provides an early example. Using publicly available compensation
disclosures, performance targets, and performance data, Equilar’s applications
generate “pay-for-performance” scores that can be used to determine whether an
executive is over- or under-paid relative to executives of similarly situated
companies.62
Tests (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-ag-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billioncriminal-and-civil-penalties-six.
54. See Gramitto Ricci, supra note 20, at 877 n.28, 901, 903; see also Petrin, supra note 20, at 1005.
55. But see, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 692 (describing the risk that decisionmakers mask their
intentions by using biased data). See also infra notes 124–133 and accompanying text.
56. On groupthink, see generally IRVING JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK (1972).
57. Akshaya Kamalnath, The Perennial Quest for Board Independence: Artificial Intelligence to the
Rescue?, 83 ALB. L. REV. 43, 52 (2020); JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT,
PROMISES BROKEN 61–62 (2008) (describing the pressure to conform to social norms of collegiality and
cooperation within boardrooms).
58. Gramitto Ricci, supra note 20, at 871; Michal S. Gal, Algorithmic Challenges to Autonomous Choice,
25 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 59, 61 (2018); Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 88.
59. Deep Knowledge Venture’s [sic] Appoints Intelligent Investment Analysis Software VITAL as Board
Member, GLOBALNEWSWIRE (May 13, 2014), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2014/05/
13/635881/10081467/en/Deep-Knowledge-Venture-s-Appoints-Intelligent-Investment-Analysis-SoftwareVITAL-as-Board-Member.html.
60. See Nicholas Bloom, Luis Garicano, Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, The Distinct Effects of
Information Technology and Communication Technology on Firm Organization, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2859 passim
(2014) (finding evidence that better information technologies are associated with more autonomy and a wider
control span).
61. Philippe Aghion, Benjamin F. Jones & Charles I. Jones, Artificial Intelligence and Economic Growth,
in THE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: AN AGENDA 237, 264–66 (Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans & Avi
Goldfarb eds., 2019).
62. U.S. Patent Pub. App. No. US 2013/0159067 A1 (filed June 20, 2013), https://pdfaiw.uspto.gov/
.aiw?PageNum=0&docid=20130159067&IDKey=D5D2F8454786&HomeUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fappft.uspto.g
ov%2Fnetacgi%2Fnph–Parser%3FSect1%3DPTO1%2526Sect2%3DHITOFF%2526d%3DPG01%2526p%
3D1%2526u%3D%25252Fnetahtml%25252FPTO%25252Fsrchnum.html%2526r%3D1%2526f%3DG%2526l
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II. CORPTECH’S IMPACT: THE END OF THE BOARD AS WE KNOW IT?
Since Melvin Eisenberg’s seminal book, The Structure of the Corporation,
corporate law scholars posit that a monitoring board is necessary to keep selfinterested managers at bay and to ensure that shareholder interests are catered
to.63 Corporate governance practices at U.S. listed companies have increasingly
conformed to such a scholarly approach.64
Tech proponents argue that shareholders will no longer need boards to
monitor managers because shareholders will be able to do the monitoring
themselves.65 For the same reason, there will be no need for boards to mediate
between the company’s management on the one hand and shareholders on the
other.66 Finally, because humans are not prepared for the challenges presented
by tech developments, they may even be replaced, partially or fully, by
CorpTech automata.67
We lay out the tech proponents’ view in the following two ways. First, we
relay their argument that CorpTech will diminish the need for a monitoring and
mediating board (Part II.A). Second, we present the view that the remaining
board tasks can be achieved more efficiently by CorpTech algorithms (Part II.B).
A. OBSOLESCENT BOARDS?
1. Real-Time Accounting and “Full Transparency”
According to tech proponents, the days of information asymmetry between
firms’ insiders and outsiders are numbered: real-time accounting will replace
traditional accounting and firms will voluntarily post their ordinary business
transactions on a blockchain accessible to the public.68 In David Yermack’s
words, thanks to DLTs “[a]nyone could aggregate the firm’s transactions into
the form of an income statement and balance sheet at any time, and investors
would no longer need to rely on quarterly financial statements prepared by the
firm and its auditors.”69 Based on the assumption that technology will eventually
lead to proprietary information being shared with investors and other market
participants, tech proponents argue that full transparency will increase
shareholder trust in the integrity of a corporation’s data and render costly audits
%3D50%2526s1%3D%25252220130159067%252522.PGNR.%2526OS%3DDN%2F20130159067%2526RS
%3DDN%2F20130159067 (detailing the algorithms and data sources used for calculating the score).
63. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A L EGAL ANALYSIS 156–85
(1976).
64. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1518–40 (2007) (highlighting how the
monitoring board model has prevailed in the U.S. in the decades following Melvin Eisenberg’s influential work).
65. See infra Part II.A.
66. On the mediating function of boards, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 269–82 (1999) (arguing that the corporation is a “mediating
hierarchy” of partially contradicting interests and that the board’s core function is to balance those interests to
the benefit of the firm).
67. See infra Part II.B.
68. Yermack, supra note 43, at 18, 24–25.
69. Id. at 24.
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by potentially corrupt professional firms useless.70 In turn, greater transparency,
coupled with enhanced post-trade efficiency, will reduce transaction costs and
improve liquidity in capital markets.71
Ultimately, tech proponents expect lower agency costs arising in
connection with the selection of directors and executives,72 accrued earnings
management,73 related party transactions,74 and management compensation
systems.75 This should vanquish the need for boards to focus on such issues.76
2. More Direct Shareholder Influence
The optimism regarding enhanced transparency is not limited to
accounting information but extends to transparency of ownership,77 prompting
the view that DLT-induced transparency could replace mandatory disclosure of
beneficial ownership and prevent empty voting.78
More generally, according to Yermack, DLTs have the potential of
“dramatically affect[ing] the balance of power between directors, managers, and
shareholders.”79 Greater transparency on trading and ownership data may erode
profit opportunities for active traders, shareholder activists, and raiders, while
the (supposed) increased liquidity of a blockchain-based market would reduce
the costs of selling and may therefore lead to more emphasis being placed on
exit (trading) as opposed to voice (voting).80 This would reduce the importance

70. Id. at 24–25; Vedat Akgiray, Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Blockchain Technology and
Corporate Governance, at 24–25, Doc. No. DAF/CA/CG/RD(2018)1/REV1 (June 6, 2018); see also Reyes et
al., supra note 15, at 18–21 (albeit more cautiously as to the whether such a setup is desirable).
71. Yermack, supra note 43, at 18.
72. Hamdani et al., supra note 33, at 229; Kamalnath, supra note 57, passim; see Isil Erel, Léa H. Stern,
Chenhao Tan & Michael S. Weisbach, Selecting Directors Using Machine Learning 34 (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 605/2019, 2019) (describing an experiment with algorithms to make out-of-sample
predictions of director performance, using shareholder approval rates as well as firm returns and profitability as
proxies, testing the quality of these predictions, and concluding that “[m]achine learning holds promise for
understanding the process by which governance structures are chosen, and has potential to help real-world firms
improve their governance”).
73. Yermack, supra note 43, at 25.
74. Id.
75. Hamdani et al., supra note 33, at 229; Yermack, supra note 43, at 20–21. Yermack also notes that
blockchain trading of a company’s shares may reduce the effectiveness of equity-based management incentives:
assuming that part of management’s compensation is legal insider trading (that is, trading in compliance with
insider trading laws), he predicts real-time transparency to prompt less active managerial trading out of concern
of sending adverse signals to the market. Yermack, supra note 43, at 20–21. In turn, if management profits less
from legal insider trading, firms might have to pay management more to offset their foregone gains. Id.
76. Yermack, supra note 43, at 20–21, 25; Hamdani et al., supra note 33, at 229.
77. Geis, supra note 13, at 255–62 (discussing distributed ledgers and blockchain for creating traceable
shares in the clearing and settlement system); id. at 267–69 (arguing that traceable shares lead to a fully
transparent “centralized ledger of owners”).
78. Yermack, supra note 43, at 24 (arguing that the tech-based increase in transparency will render empty
voting more difficult). Empty voting refers to the exercise of shareholder voting rights without the underlying
economic interest. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 828–36 (2006).
79. Yermack, supra note 43, at 9.
80. Id. at 19–20.
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of the board as a mediator among shareholder constituencies with diverging
interests.
At the same time, a private distributed ledger recording shareholder voting
could increase speed and accuracy, thereby reducing voting costs and increasing
shareholder participation.81
The blockchain also allows for decentralized, virtual-only shareholder
meetings,82 which may induce shareholders to demand votes on a wider range
of topics and with greater frequency than they do today. All in all, the advent of
CorpTech would justify the opening of “a debate for a new equilibrium of the
division of powers between the shareholders and the board of directors.”83 This
could result in shareholders assuming indirect control over management,
reducing the need for board monitoring.84
B. TOWARD ALGO-BOARDS?
An even bolder prediction is that machines will replace human-populated
boards. There are two components to this view: first, board functions are
becoming more challenging for humans;85 and, second, CorpTech solutions will
be able to perform board functions better than humans.
With firms depending more and more on technology, and in an
environment increasingly characterized by uncertainty and constant
disequilibrium,86 humans may become less fit to serve as board members than
machines.87 Humans may also be less willing to do so: in a fully IT-dominated
environment they will be increasingly incapable of reviewing and overseeing
self-learning algorithms and yet, as board members, their reputation will be on
the line if such algorithms prove to be deficient.
CorpTech could step in and replace human directors as corporate monitors.
Assaf Hamdani et al. suggest that “AI algorithms may become better on average
at making governance decisions than individuals due to their superior ability to
process information, freedom from biases, and lack of side interests.”88 If one
role is left to the monitoring board, it is in the choice of algorithms.89 Liberated

81. Id. at 23; Geis, supra note 13, at 267–69, 272–73 (arguing that DLT can enhance voting turnout and
reduce the costs of shareholder activism).
82. Lafarre & Van der Elst, supra note 15, at 25.
83. Id.
84. Bankewitz et al., supra note 19, at 63.
85. See, e.g., id. at 65.
86. See, e.g., Mark Fenwick & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Technology and Corporate Governance: Blockchain,
Crypto, and Artificial Intelligence, 48 TEX. J. BUS. L. 1, 2 (2019) (predicting that firms face new “conditions of
radical cognitive and normative uncertainty”).
87. See id. at 8–10 (speculating about AI replacing board functions); see also Florian Möslein, Robots in
the Boardroom: Artificial Intelligence and Corporate Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 649, 649–50 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018) (predicting use of AI in
the boardroom).
88. Hamdani et al., supra note 33, at 229.
89. Id. at 230.
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from their monitoring tasks, boards could focus on strategic advice instead.90
Board composition would change accordingly: more business and fewer
accounting and monitoring experts would be needed.91
But a more radical prediction is that boards will not necessarily continue
to exist as we know them, namely as a group of humans. In this view, boards’
functions, or board seats, may rather be taken over by algorithms. While
qualifying VITAL,92 its Finnish peer Alicia T,93 and AI algorithms generally as
board members may be nothing more than a publicity stunt, the discussions on
whether legal personality (so-called e-personhood) should be assigned to
algorithms94 and whether algorithms should be allowed to sit on boards95 signal
CorpTech’s intrusion into the core of corporate governance.

III. THE DEMISE OF THE BOARD AS A TECH NIRVANA FALLACY
Can board functions be automated to the point of making corporate boards
superfluous, as the tech proponents envisage?96
We argue in this Part that the tech proponents’ prediction is unpersuasive:
it reflects an excessively optimistic view about the present (and predictable)
capabilities of the salient technological developments, while disregarding the
impact on CorpTech of human input persistence.
We develop our tech nirvana fallacy critique in three steps. First, we briefly
describe what boards do and why they do it (Part III.A). We then take on the
prediction that machines will make the monitoring board redundant (Part III.B),
before challenging the claim that technology will enable shareholders to oversee
managers directly and make mediating boards obsolete (Part III.C). We conclude
that, although CorpTech will improve boards’ performance, their present core
functions will remain unchanged.
A. BOARDS’ CORE FUNCTIONS
Before discussing why the tech proponents’ view suffers from a tech
nirvana fallacy, let us first briefly review why we have boards and what they do.
Although most readers will be familiar with these concepts, a brief account of
boards’ core functions will set the stage for the following analysis of why
technology in the foreseeable future will not displace boards.
90. Id.; see also Mark Fenwick, Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The End of ‘Corporate’
Governance: Hello ‘Platform’ Governance, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 171, 191–97 (2019).
91. Hamdani et al., supra note 33, at 230.
92. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
93. Alicia T is the nickname of an AI executive of Finnish software company Tieto. Antony Peyton, Alicia
Key to Tieto’s AI Leadership Team, FINTECH FUTURES (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.fintechfutures.com/
2016/10/alicia-key-to-tietos-ai-leadership-team/.
94. See European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with Recommendations to the Commission
on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)), EUR. PARL. DOC. P8_TA(2017)0051, at 3 (2017)
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0051_EN.pdf. But see Gramitto Ricci, supra note
20, at 889–91 (arguing against e-personhood).
95. See Gramitto Ricci, supra note 20, at 899–901.
96. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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The Delaware General Corporation Law, as the most important state
legislation on corporate law, states that the “business and affairs of every
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors.”97 In practice, boards do not manage corporations, but rather steer
them by monitoring the top management in an effort to reduce agency costs.98
Boards also engage as mediators in order to reduce conflicts with and among
shareholders and stakeholders.99
1. The Monitoring Board
Collective action problems among dispersed shareholders, coupled with
their limited access to information,100 leave room for managerial opportunism.101
In particular, shareholders have traditionally been unable to act upon negative
signals about managerial performance other than by voting with their feet.102
A well-functioning board of directors can reduce agency costs;103 an
independent board may do better than shareholders at monitoring managers on
their behalf. Directors can combine the signals of inferior performance coming
from stock prices with their access to inside information in order to gain a better
sense of whether negative relative stock performance is due to incompetence,
bad luck, or neither.104 They may well come to the conclusion that managers are
simply ahead of their times, that is, busy implementing an idiosyncratic vision
97. DEL. COD. ANN. tit. 8., § 141(a) (2020).
98. EISENBERG, supra note 63, at 164–65 (stating that directors’ task is to hold executives accountable for
adequate results under monitoring model); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 80 (3d ed. 2015)
(“Among [the various board’s functions] . . . the board’s monitoring role reigns supreme.”).
99. Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board: Three Theories of Corporate Boards of Directors, 22 J. CORP.
L. 1, 10–14 (1996) [hereinafter Dallas, The Relational Board] (stating that, in addition to monitoring, the board
assumes a relational role with the external environment including information access and exchange, support of
corporate business and ensuring legitimacy and status in the eyes of shareholders and stakeholders); see also
Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Dual Board and Board
Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91, 101 (1997) [hereinafter Dallas, Proposals for Reform] (outlining
the relational role of boards).
100. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 95 (1986) (detailing the effects of rational apathy on
shareholder voting); see also Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy”, 2 ACCT., ECON. & L.,
no. 2, 2012, at 1, 7 (2012) (“[S]hareholders’ own rational apathy raises an often-insurmountable obstacle to
collective action.”).
101. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 47–49 (1985) (stating
that opportunism involves self-interested behavior with elements of ploy, deception, misrepresentation or bad
faith, resulting in management’s appropriation of assets or shirking).
102. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder
Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 453–57 (1991).
103. In addition to boards, other mechanisms that reduce agency conflicts include reputational incentives,
the market for managerial services, the takeover market, and compensation schemes. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black,
Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 831 (1992)
(providing a list of non-legal constraints on managerial behavior).
104. See Gordon, supra note 64, at 1563 (detailing the shift towards “informative[] stock market prices” and
the evaluation of management’s decisions with stock market signals); see also Enrichetta Ravina & Paola
Sapienza, What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their Trading, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 962, 974,
1000–01 (2009) (finding that independent directors earn positive and substantial abnormal returns when trading
in their company shares, which is of course an indication of superior information compared to the market as a
whole).
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that the market is yet unable to comprehend and/or price correctly.105 Directors
also have the incentives to take the necessary steps, because not only are their
reputations on the line if they remain passive,106 but they are also increasingly
compensated with stock options that are of no value unless the company’s stock
performance is positive.107
Directors are therefore in the position of fruitfully engaging with managers
if their company is underperforming and determining whether the CEO should
stay or go. But, of course, monitoring goes way beyond that; in particular, it
includes three additional tasks.
First, oversight of management implies some degree of involvement in
strategy setting:108 a board formally approves a company’s strategies, but it does
so based on top managers’ proposals and the information set made available to
it by the latter.109 Given the information disadvantage of (outside) board
members,110 they are unlikely to be in a position to really define a company’s
strategy. That is why a board’s approval of strategies is better understood as part
of its monitoring function: a board reviews the top managers’ definition and
implementation of the company’s strategy more as a “sounding board” than as a
(real) decision-maker.111
In addition, a board’s monitoring function, usually via one or more of its
committees, focuses on the corporation’s governance, risk management, and
compliance (hereinafter, “GRC”) systems.112 The board’s oversight on GRC
systems aims to ensure: first, that the level and characteristics of the risks
undertaken by the company are consistent with its risk profile (as resulting also
from its strategies); second, that the risk of infidelity on the part of managers
and employees is kept low; and, third, that violations of the law are reasonably
prevented.
Finally, boards deal with inherent, as well as occasional, conflicts of
interest between top managers and the corporation, to ensure the corporation’s
interest prevails, in particular with regard to executive compensation and selfdealing.113

105. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560,
567 (2016).
106. John Armour, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance
Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 49, 62 (3d ed. 2017) (describing independent directors as “motivated principally
by ethical and reputational concerns”).
107. See, e.g., David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors,
59 J. FIN. 2281, 2286–88 (2004).
108. See, e.g., Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217, 218 (2007).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 73,
543 (2014).
113. MACEY, supra note 57, at 51–54, 59–60.
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2. The Mediating Board
In the last few decades, with the reconcentration of ownership in the hands
of institutional investors114 and the rise of giant asset management companies,115
boards’ tasks have partly changed. Today, it is the norm for institutional
shareholders to engage in a dialogue with both company officers and
independent directors.116 Whether boards should engage in such a relational role
has been the subject of discussion among U.S. corporate law scholars,117 but
corporate practice has bypassed the theoretical dispute.
In recent years, institutional investors have pushed hard to establish twoway communication between (non-executive) directors and themselves,118
thereby breaking management’s previously held monopoly in dealing with
shareholders. As a matter of fact, the continuous dialogue between a company
and its shareholders is increasingly carried out by boards,119 turning mediation
into a second core function of boards.
B. AUTOMATION OF MONITORING AS THE SOLUTION?
We argue in this Subpart that, were CorpTech to replace human-populated
boards, decisions would not be better than they are today from the shareholders’
perspective. The contrary assertion rests, on the one hand, on an overly
optimistic assessment of what technology can do, and, on the other, on an overly
simplistic view of a board’s current functions. We predict a more limited role
114. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 89, 91–93 (2017).
115. John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 2, 8 (Harv. L.
Sch., Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018) (predicting that control of most public companies will soon be
concentrated in the hands of a very small number of people, that is, those at the top of large management
companies).
116. See Giovanni Strampelli, Knocking at the Boardroom Door: A Transatlantic Overview of DirectorInstitutional Investor Engagement in Law and Practice, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 187, 199 (2018).
117. Compare John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are
U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 840–46 (1999) (detailing cases when the mediating models fails),
and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 547, 559–60 (2003) (arguing that the mediating model has a small domain), with Dallas, The Relational
Board, supra note 99, at 3 (arguing that the board is the right organ to mediate among shareholders and
management and holding that relationship management is part of the board’s fiduciary duties), and John H.
Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative
for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (1994) (same). See also Blair & Stout, supra note 66, at 288
(arguing that corporate law supports the board’s mediating role); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director
Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 423–38 (2001) (same).
118. See Strampelli, supra note 116, at 199 (reporting that U.S. corporations increasingly involve boards, in
addition to management, in the dialogue with their shareholders).
119. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1061 (2014) (arguing that shareholder relationship management is an important
board task); see also Strampelli, supra note 116, at 197–200 (reporting that boards, in addition to management,
engage in dialogue with shareholders); MCKINSEY & CO., THE BOARD PERSPECTIVE: A COLLECTION OF
MCKINSEY INSIGHTS FOCUSING ON BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 49 (2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/
McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Leadership/The%20board%20perspective/Issue%20Number%202/2018_Boar
d%20Perspective_Number_2.pdf (stating in Exhibit 5 that in 2017 boards spent 9% of their meeting time on
shareholder and stakeholder management, up from 0% in 2013).
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for CorpTech in the boardroom: similar to how, up until today, operational,
financial, legal, accounting, or risk experts advise boards, which then come to
their own conclusions based on those experts’ input, CorpTech can and will
inform board members about options and opportunities without replacing them.
We first discuss the tech-based arguments against the demise of the
monitoring board (Part III.B.1) and then turn to the inherent traits of corporate
governance that justify the prediction of monitoring as a persistent function of
corporate boards (Part III.B.2).
1. IT Limitations
Technology may help address humans’ cognitive biases and improve the
quality of their decisions.120 But technology’s own limits make the proposed
scenario of machines replacing boards unrealistic. These limits121 are outlined
in this Subpart. In their presence, CorpTech will augment boards’ effectiveness
but will not replace them.
a. Data Dependency
Predictions identify patterns in past data and offer them as projections
about future events, basically assuming that history will repeat itself one way or
another.122 Hence, an algorithm is only as good as the data it works with. Where
data of the past reflects biases, so too will the machine results:123 the data could
reflect the biases of prior decision-makers124 or biases that persist in society at
large.125 Developers tend to be unaware of either any particular deficiencies in
the data set or the ensuing discrimination.126 As a study on Facebook’s selfpricing algorithm for educational advertisements has shown, an algorithm
designed to be gender-neutral still steered advertising for science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics courses to more men than women because the
algorithm priced advertisement to women higher than advertisement to men; as

120. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Biases, 86 SOC. RSCH. 499 passim (2019) (arguing
that algorithms can be designed to be unbiased and perform certain tasks better than biased humans). But see
Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2251 (2019) (“It is possible to replace one form of
disparity with another, but impossible to eliminate it altogether.”).
121. We do not discuss, though, two obvious IT issues: deficient coding as a result of human inaccuracy
and exposure to cyber risks. While troublesome, they are not relevant for our purposes as they appear not to have
any specific implication in regards to CorpTech.
122. Mayson, supra note 120, at 2251.
123. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 673–74; see also Mayson, supra note 120, at 2251–52.
124. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 673–74; see also Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz & Kate
Crawford, Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing
Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 192, 204–17 (2019) (detailing examples of manipulated data in the
criminal justice system, reflecting racial bias).
125. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 671 (“[D]ata mining can discover surprisingly useful regularities
that are really just preexisting patterns of exclusion and inequality.”).
126. Conscious choices may, however, be the result of conflicts of interests (see infra Part III.B.2.b). And
lack of awareness does not exclude racially or gender biased, or otherwise illegal, practices. See Richardson et
al., supra note 124, at 193–97 (detailing examples of such practices in the context of predictive policing).
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a consequence, for a given budget more men than women were exposed to the
advertisement.127
Furthermore, AI’s predictive capabilities depend on the training data.128
The “learning” of a self-learning machine refers to identifying patterns in
existing data sets where instances of, say, securities fraud are labeled as such.129
The machine then looks for patterns among the labeled cases without using
explicit instructions.130 That subset of recurring characteristics can then be used
for any other dataset.131 Where the subset characteristics are found to be present,
the machine will assume that securities fraud is also present. What the machine
“learns” depends on the examples it has been exposed to, as well as on the
quality of the labeling.132 The closer the training data to the real-world
application, the better the predictive ability of the AI.133 For instance, a data set
taken from Enron Corporation has often been used to train many AI-enhanced
compliance tools.134 As we know today, Enron’s internal communication
methods and (bad) governance were in many respects outliers, even relative to
the less governance-aware corporate world of Enron’s times.135 AI trained with
outlandish, outdated, and incomplete data from Enron will lack predictive
accuracy for most firms.136
Firms may seek to enhance predictive accuracy by training the AI with data
generated inside their own organization.137 In this case, data availability may
emerge as an issue. Even where firms have the right to use or transfer data,138
small- and medium-sized firms are likely to lack data pools of sufficient size to
train the technology.139 Large firms that collect sufficient data, however, may

127. Anja Lambrecht & Catherine Tucker, Algorithmic Bias? An Empirical Study of Apparent GenderBased Discrimination in the Display of STEM Career Ads, 65 MGMT. SCI. 2966, 2966–68, 2977–78 (2019)
(analyzing an advertisement algorithm intended to be gender-neutral in its delivery and concluding that any
algorithm that simply optimizes cost-effectiveness in ad delivery will deliver ads in an apparently discriminatory
way).
128. See RUSSEL & NORVIG, supra note 48, at 701–02.
129. See generally id. at 693–95 (discussing various types of learning algorithms that use input-output pairs).
130. Id. at 694–95, 698.
131. Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 95.
132. Id.; RUSSEL & NORVIG, supra note 48, at 701–02.
133. See id. at 706–08 (describing preconditions of learning from examples).
134. Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 97 (stating that machine learning developers use coaching
data from widely available data sets, such as the Enron email data set that was originally put online by the U.S.
Federal Energy Regulation Commission). The data set contains data from about 150 users, mostly senior
management of Enron, with a total of about half a million messages. William W. Cohen, Enron Email Dataset,
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~./enron/ (May 8, 2015).
135. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 23, at 270–71, 282–82; CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW
AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AROUND THE WORLD 47–67 (2008) (discussing the Enron scandal).
136. The e-mails’ text had been redacted in response to privacy concerns and attachments to messages had
been deleted to reduce data size. Cohen, supra note 134.
137. Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 97–98.
138. The data pool available for Corptech training may be limited by legal barriers, including data
protection, intellectual property laws, and confidentiality agreements signed with customers and business
partners. See id. at 100.
139. Id. at 98.
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hesitate to share firm-specific data with external developers. These data may be
too valuable to share in an environment where “data is the new oil,”140 as they,
or the training results thereof, can be, respectively, copied and (once
incorporated into services) sold to competitors. Worse still, external developers
may become competitors themselves after assembling a large enough data
pool.141
Finally, finding some regularities in past data (however recent and “big”)
is more useful in some areas, such as medical diagnoses and image recognition,
than in others, such as social dynamics. Human behavior is less predictable, as
markets and people’s preferences evolve. Because humans adapt to changes,
responses to a given context that were observed regularly in the past will not
necessarily be good predictors of the future. To generalize, correlations between
complex, dynamic human phenomena that interact with other organizations and
an indefinite number of individuals (stakeholders, consumers, etc.), are poor
predictors of future outcomes.
The data dependency problems highlighted so far reflect the current state
of the relevant technologies. These problems may well be overcome at some
point in the future. For instance, an application for bias analysis may recognize
and remedy the impact of biased data,142 and the publicly available data pools
can become large enough to allow for accurate training. Even then, however, the
core issue with data dependency, namely, its backward orientation, will remain
unresolved: in real life, it is normally the case that the right answers to the
questions defining the success or failure of a firm, such as whether to enter a
new market or to leave the CEO in place, to assume growth or a shrinking global
demand mid- to long-term, cannot be found in past data. AI-based predictions
can effectively support those decisions, but in the end something very human is
required: judgment.143

140. The origin of this sentence is uncertain. One of the earliest sources to use it dates back to 2006. Michael
Palmer, Data Is the New Oil, ANA MARKETING MAESTROS (Nov. 3, 2006, 5:43 AM), http://ana.blogs.com/
maestros/2006/11/data_is_the_new.html.
141. Cf. Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner & Janos N. Barberis, From FinTech to
TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 393, 399–415 (2018)
(analyzing the entrance of big data firms like Alibaba, Amazon, Apple, Baidou and Google into the financial
services sector).
142. See Rumman Chowdhury & Narendra Mulani, Auditing Algorithms for Bias, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct.
24, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/10/auditing-algorithms-for-bias (presenting a tool developed by Accenture and
the Alan Turing Institute that measures the discriminatory impact of big data applications and corrects for
predictive parity to achieve equal opportunity).
143. See Surden, supra note 6, at 97–98 (arguing that AI approximates intelligence by detecting proxies,
patterns, or heuristics and emphasizing that many complicated problems “may not be amenable to such a
heuristic-based technique”); Mohammad Hossein Jarrahi, Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work:
Human-AI Symbiosis in Organizational Decision Making, 61 BUS. HORIZONS 577, 580 (2018) (“Unlike board
games, in which the probability of the next action can be calculated, real-world decision making is messy and
reliance on probabilistic, analytical thinking tends to be insufficient.”).
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b. Conflicts with Human Ethics
Morally wrong determinations can seriously harm a firm’s reputation and
its share price.144 Were CorpTech to make such decisions, the risk of unethical
determinations revealing themselves to be spectacular mistakes would
skyrocket. That is because training machines in ethical matters is an impossible
challenge, as “[ethical] norms are fuzzy.”145 Humans themselves often cannot
tell what prompts their value judgments. Even in a CorpTech world, then,
aligning corporate behavior with mainstream ethics requires human involvement
(and human-populated board oversight).
c. Inferior Handling of Incomplete Law
Where an incident (a violation of the law or an employee’s wrongdoing) is
reported, the corporate response will depend on a unique combination of factors.
In fact, most GRC issues imply discretion, even for cases that are very similar
to past ones. Hence, a pre-determined 1/0, yes/no algorithm will be unable to
reach good decisions on how to react.146 This is the inevitable implication of the
incompleteness that characterizes the legal environment, where not only are
contracts incomplete, but so too is the law itself:147 neither contracts nor the law
can provide for clear-cut rules for every situation. Drafting exhaustive contracts
and laws would be incredibly expensive and, in fact, outright impossible, and so
too would the creation of a CorpTech solution attempting to do just that.148
Governance arrangements themselves are incomplete on purpose,149 and hence
unfit for strict tech-based execution.

144. For instance, its relationship with Definers Public Affairs, a Washington-based opposition research
firm cost Facebook nine percent of its share price on a single day, or $36 billion, which at the time was slightly
less than the total value of the carmaker Ford. Salvador Rodriguez, Here Are the Scandals and Other Incidents
That Have Sent Facebook’s Share Price Tanking in 2018, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/20/
facebooks-scandals-in-2018-effect-on-stock.html (Nov. 20, 2018, 10:22 PM).
145. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996).
146. 1/0 is the paradigm of Boolean logic. But human judgment follows neither Boolean logic nor any other
conventional mathematical discipline. This is also true when you soften the 0/1 paradigm using probability
theory or fuzzy logic (since fuzzy logic can operate with all infinite values within the interval <0, 1>). See, e.g.,
Václav Bezděk, Using Fuzzy Logic in Business, 124 PROCEDIA—SOC. & BEHAV. SCIS. 371, 372–79 (2014).
Whether an observer holds an incident to be probable (from her subjective point of view) or she puts an incident
into the “more negative rather than positive” box (using fuzzy logic, which requires preferences in a given order),
the analysis applying an ad hoc mix of factors results in the qualification of conduct as likely (probability) or
“more harmful than helpful” (fuzzy logic). If the factors that justify 0 or 1, a given probability assessment, or
the preferences for fuzzy qualification are impossible to discern ex ante, they cannot be put into code. See id.
147. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127–28 (2d ed. 1994) and, more recently, Katharina Pistor
& Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 931, 938–44 (2003). With specific reference
to compliance issues, see Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty-Year Lookback, 90
TEMP. L. REV. 727, 734 (2018) (“[C]omplication arises from the subjective nature of law and legal risk. Law is
often full of ambiguity, even when factual questions are posed clearly.”). See also Joshua P. Davis, Artificial
Wisdom? A Potential Limit on AI in Law (and Elsewhere), 72 OKLA. L. REV. 51, 61–65 (2019) (arguing that AI
is incapable of mimicking value-based decisions since it misses the first-person perspective).
148. See Aghion et al., supra note 61, at 41–42 (arguing that AI technologies will not overcome contractual
incompleteness).
149. See infra Part III.B.2.
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Even where a board finds that management is responsible for a GRC
failure, a formal sanction might not always be warranted: handling GRC
situations will often involve an aspect of judgment and/or adjudication under
conditions of significant uncertainty regarding the response of the sanctioned
person(s) and that of stakeholders (including employees, the public and others).
That requires the discretionary, creative, and non-rule based decision-making
that is, at least for the predictable future, part of the human skillset that machines
are unable to replicate.150 In an environment that is otherwise under the
increasing influence of technology, the board brings in the unpredictable yet
indispensable human factor.151
2. Governance’s Inherent Traits
a. The Incomplete Corporate Contract
A corporation is often described as a nexus of contracts, that is, a bundle
of formal and informal relationships among the various stakeholders.152 These
contracts are incomplete, and intentionally so, since writing a multiplicity of
complete contracts between a firm’s stakeholders would be either excessively
costly or unduly constraining.153 For these reasons, governance arrangements
are incomplete on purpose and, hence, unfit for strict tech-based execution. It is
a board’s task to continue writing chapters of the corporate contract where
necessary. Corporate governance provides the tools to deal with such
incompleteness: as circumstances change and new information becomes
available, management, boards, and shareholders react by making decisions,
each in their own sphere, that allow for adaptation and optimization to a degree
that ex ante planning could not match.154
CorpTech will not eradicate contractual incompleteness, whether by
superior ex ante planning or by better-than-human ex post decisions. Such
eradication would require not only access to, and correct processing of, all
existing data in the world (something that CorpTech may well provide for in the

150. See Dylan Hadfield-Menell & Gillian K. Hadfield, Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignment, in
AAAI/ACM CONFERENCE ON AI, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 417, 419–20 (2019) (arguing that coders are yet
incapable of replicating norms and standards that grant discretion to their addressees).
151. This is not to deny that humans, and human-populated boards, make mistakes too. See infra notes 156–
160.
152. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1426 (1989).
153. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
91–93 (1991). This point is acknowledged in the literature on new technologies. See Sklaroff, supra note 8, at
263 (arguing that human-based contracting is flexible due to inherent incompleteness, while machine-based
contracting creates new inefficiencies from automation, decentralization, and anonymity); Adam J. Kolber, NotSo-Smart Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 198, 220 (2018) (arguing
that the code does not reflect the entirety of the parties’ agreement); Hadfield-Menell & Hadfield, supra note
150, at 421–22 (emphasizing “parallels between the challenge of incomplete contracting in the human principalagent setting and the challenge of misspecification in robot reward functions”).
154. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 152, at 1437–39 (arguing that the contract adopted as optimal
ex ante may not be optimal ex post, for instance due to changing circumstances such as a takeover bid).
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future), but also the ability to predict all future developments. In a nondeterministic world like the one that humans inhabit, and where humans still
make meaningful decisions, machines are highly unlikely to become powerful
enough to do that. Any set of codes predicting future events would require a
significant level of speculation and thus would be certain to be flawed (despite
its prohibitive cost).
To be sure, the benchmark of technology, and AI in particular, is not
perfection but human parity.155 Any CorpTech solution completing contracts ex
post better than human boards would justify algorithmic boards. And it is easy
to acknowledge that human boards are themselves far from perfect in making
the decisions executing the incomplete corporate contract. Arguably, they are
also limited in their ability to learn, as recurring governance scandals
demonstrate. Still, one thing human boards are better at than CorpTech, and can
be predicted to be for a long time, are complex interactions with humans.156 Take
the example of the Wells Fargo scandal.157 The bank was forced to switch to
political mode and face, among other things, multiple U.S. House and Senate
Committee hearings158 in order to minimize the reputational fallout.159 Such a
mode includes intense lobbying action, public relations efforts, and generally
presenting in a positive light a firm’s corporate culture, values, and ethics. Soft
skills and fuzzy matters such as these are unsuitable for automation:160 any
sufficiently intricate, politically charged matter requires humans to interact with
humans.
b. Conflicts of Interest
An algorithm is not an “impartial” tool: it assists its creators in settling
affairs within a community according to its creators’ preferences.161 So long as
algorithms are written by humans and, even more importantly, sold to humans,
claims that algorithms can be non-conflicted or neutral are ill-founded:
CorpTech solutions are bound to reflect the interests and views of those
ultimately in control of the code design and/or selection process. If, as has
hitherto been the case across corporations, management wields influence over

155. See RUSSEL & NORVIG, supra note 48, at 2–3.
156. Simple communication between machines and humans does take place regularly and frequently.
157. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Holding Megabanks Accountable: An Examination of Wells Fargo’s Pattern of Consumer
Abuses: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Timothy J. Sloan,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Wells Fargo).
159. For an account of how Wells Fargo managed the scandal fallout, see Hilary Fussell Sisco, Financial
Crisis Management and Wells Fargo: Reputation or Profit?, in THE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL
COMMUNICATION AND INVESTOR RELATIONS 319, 319 (Alexander V. Laskin ed., 2018).
160. See Hadfield-Menell & Hadfield, supra note 150, at 421 (acknowledging that “alignment of artificially
intelligent agents with human goals and values is a fundamental challenge in AI research”).
161. See LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH
TECHNOLOGY 21–22 (1986).
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the CorpTech system as a component of its IT system,162 then CorpTech
solutions will reflect management’s interests and views. If management’s
incentives are not perfectly aligned to those of their principals, then boards’ (and
shareholders’) trust in the relevant CorpTech will be misplaced.163
The coders (perhaps with the help of their marketing departments if they
are independent suppliers) will understand which functions, within corporations,
are in charge of selecting them as code suppliers and directing their work. They
will naturally make product choices that fit such buyers’ interests. If decisions
on Corptech products are under managers’ control, then the CorpTech will
further management’s interests.
To illustrate this general point about conflicted coding, take the issue of
managerial compensation. It has been debated whether this is an area where
abuse and suboptimal bad practices are ripe, be it because CEO compensation
packages are excessive or because prevailing compensation practices generate
skewed incentives for managers.164 Contrary to the tech proponents’ view,165
unless the analogic mechanics of executive compensation setting are fixed (so
long as they need fixing),166 digital solutions will be no better than analogue
ones. In fact, if the current system relying on compensation consultants selected
by independent board committees and assisting the latter in their determinations
is flawed, then there is little reason to believe that an algorithm will improve
upon current practices: it will instead reflect any flaws arising from them. What
it can achieve is the devising of the perfect compensation package that the
existing compensation practices allow for: this is a different kind of perfect—
perfect not in the sense of being optimal for shareholders, but in the sense of

162. Chief Information (or Technology) Officers usually report to the CEO or the CFO. See, e.g.,
ALEXANDER HÜTTER & RENÉ RIEDL, CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER ROLE EFFECTIVENESS: LITERATURE REVIEW
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 12 (2017).
163. In other words, the governance risk of CorpTech stems not only from “bad coding” in a technical sense,
but also from the fact that code developed under management influence is bound to be skewed towards
management’s interests. John Armour, Luca Enriques, Ariel Ezrachi & John Vella, Putting Technology to Good
Use for Society: The Role of Corporate, Competition and Tax Law, 6 J. BRIT. ACAD. 285, 298 (2018) (“[T]he
incentives of the persons designing a firm’s internal performance monitoring systems are likely to become even
more significant.”).
164. Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 passim (2002) (arguing that
structural flaws in corporate governance have enabled managers to influence their own pay and extract rents to
the detriment of shareholders), with Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power
Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847 passim (2002) (criticizing Bebchuk, Fried,
and Walker’s theses), and Steven N. Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid?, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPS. 5, 8–14
(2008) (criticizing the view that U.S. CEOs are overpaid and not paid for performance).
165. As we have seen, some have suggested that AI and Big Data may allow a company to consider all
relevant information and possibly learn from other companies’ best practices to devise the optimal compensation
package, while smart contracts could make the compensation arrangement harder to alter in opportunistic ways
further down the road. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
166. The jury, of course, is still out on whether executive compensation is more a solution to, or a
manifestation of, managerial agency problems. For a recent discussion of the various facets of the problem, see,
for example, Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Executive Remuneration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 334 passim (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).
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perfectly processing all information in the way that best caters to the interests of
those who control the process.
c. Information Flows
The biggest hindrance to a more balanced distribution of power between
management, boards, and shareholders in publicly held corporations is
management’s exclusive access to the inner workings of the corporate business
and its ensuing filtering role regarding the information set that is needed to
monitor its performance.167 Can IT solutions overcome such a hitherto inevitable
corporate governance trait? So long as management retains control of the coding,
data sources, and algorithms used for reporting to a board,168 the answer is no.
Take again here the example of executive compensation. Optimal
compensation packages are firm- and employee-specific.169 Coding optimal
compensation models requires in-depth, firm-specific, forward-looking
information usually monopolized by management. If management is involved,
it can be expected to use its superior knowledge to make sure that the code
reflects its interests.
When an AI CorpTech product processes data, understanding the extent to
which management manipulates a board by providing more or less data than
necessary and whether the algorithm presents them in an unbiased way is
increasingly difficult. The risk of algo-supported board members becoming
executives’ puppets without the slightest suspicion of being manipulated may be
even higher than for analogue boards. In fact, well-functioning analogue boards
are trained to second-guess the completeness and reliability of the supporting
information selected by the CEO. They may rely on their experience and on their
instincts. In an algorithmic world, these instincts may prove less useful and it
may be harder to question the completeness and reliability of information that a
supposedly objective machine, rather than a self-interested human, has selected
and processed.
C. THE BOARD DISINTERMEDIATION HYPOTHESIS
Involvement in shareholder dialogue grants independent directors an
important mediating role between shareholders and the company’s management.
The mediating role is premised on shareholder identification and shareholder
intelligence: companies have to get to know their shareholders (something that
CorpTech will facilitate).170 In addition, if companies are to secure shareholder

167. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 63, at 144 (“[T]he amount, quality, and structure of the information
that reaches the board is almost wholly within the control of the corporation’s executives.”); see also Bengt
Holmlström, Pay without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment, 30 J. CORP. L. 703,
711 (2005) (highlighting how boards need to have the CEO’s trust for the latter to be willing to share essential
information about the company with the former).
168. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.a.
169. See, e.g., David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal
Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 609, 621–23 (2011).
170. See supra Part I.A.2 for examples of DLT-based CorpTech solutions.
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backing, they also have to know their individual shareholders’ preferences.
Shareholder dialogue, finally, is more than simple information transmission
(something at which CorpTech is particularly good): it can include the difficult
task of persuading shareholders that something (seemingly) at odds with their
preferences should nevertheless be given support. In practice, this often involves
various rounds of negotiations and requires—as we argue in this Subpart—a
significant degree of human judgment.
Tech proponents argue that CorpTech will change the (relatively new)
mediating role of a board in two ways. First, it may enable shareholders to
monitor management themselves, making the board’s monitoring on their behalf
obsolete. In a CorpTech-dominated environment where the costs of shareholder
engagement, and voting in particular, are greatly reduced, direct shareholder-tomanagement relations may substitute for the present board-centered governance
framework.171 Second, CorpTech could make the mediating functions of nonexecutive members similarly passé, as the new information tools may allow
shareholders to directly engage with management just as effectively.
In this Subpart, we show that this board disintermediation hypothesis is
flawed: again, it disregards inherent governance features, which technology
cannot cure, and IT limitations.
1. Governance’s Inherent Features
The board disintermediation hypothesis rests on two assumptions: first,
that CorpTech allows for real-time accounting and “full transparency;” and,
second, that CorpTech further reduces the cost of processing available
information and deciding how to vote. The combination of the two should enable
shareholders to do the monitoring board’s job themselves. We do not question
the technical possibility of processing and analyzing a virtually unlimited
volume of information. And, incidentally, we leave apart the fact that DLTs
reduce the risk of data manipulation but, of course, do not ensure that data stored
via DLTs is correct.172 We argue instead that the full transparency hypothesis is
unrealistic and that, even if it was realistic, shareholder monitoring would still
be patchy at best. We finally contend that shareholder dialogue exclusively
involving executives, rather than directors, would lead to inferior outcomes.
a. Information Asymmetries to Persist
Corporations are engines of innovation. Shareholders delegate the power
to conduct a company’s business to a management team which has full control
over the company’s operations and resources under the board’s oversight.
Delegation is also needed to preserve confidentiality of a company’s plans and
strategies, which in turn is necessary for it to make profits. This is a simple fact

171. See supra Part II.A.2.
172. See, e.g., Zetzsche et al., supra note 7, at 1374.
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that is ignored in the assumption that technology-enabled full transparency can
be realized.173
Issuer disclosures, whether mandatory or voluntary, have become more
frequent and rich,174 and will become even more so in an AI-enhanced
environment where the use of machines should make information overload less
of a concern for policymakers.175 Yet, U.S. corporations can be particularly
reticent when it comes to discussing their plans, strategies, R&D projects, and
anything that may be of crucial interest to competitors. One example of that is
Apple’s protracted silence over its Apple Watch sales. While analysts agree that
such sales figures would be extremely valuable information for investors,176 U.S.
securities regulation does not require Apple to disclose them and Apple’s
management has consistently refused to voluntarily provide the market with the
relevant figures.177
Not only are corporate disclosures bound to remain patchy, but it is also
highly unlikely that technology will prevent traders from concealing their trades,
given the value of secrecy for their success.178 Tech proponents themselves
acknowledge this and present the scenario of full trading and ownership
transparency as just one option that may become available on the market for
individual issuers to choose.179 However, even issuers most worried about
hostile takeovers and activist campaigns will find an all-transparent trading
environment unattractive, and prefer tools less harmful to their cost of capital in
order to insulate themselves from hostile bidders and activists.
b. Passive and Closet Index Funds: Collective Action Problems to
Persist
Even in a world with lesser (or no) information asymmetry, the board
disintermediation hypothesis disregards the real problem with informed voting:
rational reticence. If a passive mutual fund invests in information in order to cast
the right (shareholder-value maximizing) pivotal vote, it will improve a
company’s stock performance, which means that free-riding competitors will

173. See, e.g., Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Making a Market for Corporate Disclosure, 35
YALE J. ON REGUL. 383, 391–92 (2018) (highlighting how sharing information about a firm’s successes and
failures may have a negative impact on its profitability).
174. See Gordon, supra note 64, at 1545–61.
175. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 passim (2003) (outlining the argument that too much information
can be counterproductive).
176. See, e.g., Don Reisinger, Here’s How Popular Apple Watch Was Last Quarter, FORTUNE (Feb. 8, 2017,
9:09 AM), http://fortune.com/2017/02/08/apple-watch-2016-sales/ (reporting analysts’ estimate of Apple
Watch’s sales during the fourth quarter of 2016).
177. Id. (“While Apple has said that its smartwatch is popular, the company has never revealed actual sales
figures. Apple CEO Tim Cook has argued that sharing sales figures could help competitors.”); see also Haeberle
& Henderson, supra note 173, at 392–94 (using the example of Apple’s iPad sales to illustrate how disclosure
thereof would lead to reduced cashflows).
178. Note that this argument is independent of technological progress; it will hold true even if data
processing and storage capacity keep growing exponentially.
179. Yermack, supra note 43, at 18.
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gain more than the passive mutual fund does.180 Unless the costs of getting
informed and voting become negligible, technology will not alter the incentive
of passive institutional investors (and closet index funds)181 to remain reticent.
We expect reticence to be particularly persistent given the increasing market
share of passively managed mutual funds in the asset management market.182
Delegating the whole process of deciding how to vote to a machine would
drive down the (marginal) costs of becoming informed and voting to close to
zero. An algorithm would gather all available information, evaluate it according
to a set of criteria based on its own data-crunching algorithms and spit out a
voting recommendation. That is what, with a human touch, proxy advisors do.183
It is immediately clear, though, that developing proprietary software for these
purposes would be too large an investment for an institution that mainly
competes on management fees. Existing providers of proxy services are thus
most likely to be the ones that will come up with such a product. Alternatively,
perhaps asset management service providers, such as BlackRock, could develop
this product as part of their management and administration analytics tools.184
BlackRock itself, though, is an unlikely supplier of such a product. If it were to
provide the tools for determining other institutions’ voting decisions, existing
concerns about the disproportionate power of behemoth institutional investors
and the anticompetitive effects of common ownership would substantially
increase.185 The prospect of a negative political reaction would likely discourage
BlackRock (or other large players in the asset management industry) from
entering into the proxy advice market.
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that one large investment
house develops voting decisions algorithms, it is open to question whether an
algorithm would, on average, do better at issuing voting recommendations than

180. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013).
181. In addition to overtly passive index funds, a number of “closet index funds” exist that are marketed as
actively managed funds but de facto replicate the composition of entire markets or segments thereof. K.J. Martijn
Cremerst & Quinn Curtis, Do Mutual Fund Investors Get What They Pay For? Securities Law and Closet Index
Funds, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 31, 46–67 (2016) (finding that twelve percent of mutual fund assets can be
categorized as closet index funds).
182. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2033 (2019).
183. See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an Age
of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1398–99 (2014).
184. For a description of BlackRock’s management and administration analytics tools suite, known as
Aladdin, see Daniel Haberly, Duncan MacDonald-Korth, Michael Urban & Dariusz Wójcik, Asset Management
as a Digital Platform Industry: A Global Financial Network Perspective, 106 GEOFORUM 167, 172, 176–80
(2019) (quoting Larry Fink’s dubbing of Aladdin as “the Android of finance”); Dirk A. Zetzsche, William A.
Birdthistle, Douglas W. Arner & Ross P. Buckley, Digital Finance Platforms: Toward a New Regulatory
Paradigm, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2020).
185. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1268–72 (2016) (outlining
the antitrust perils of ownership of firms within the same industry by the same large institutions).
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the staff of Institutional Shareholder Services or Glass Lewis, the two dominant
proxy advisors today.186
In turn, if those designing and selling the software are the two proxy
advisory firms themselves, as can reasonably be predicted, their product may
avoid some human error. But it is far from clear that the relevant software would
succeed in overcoming the (apparent) deficiencies of today’s proxy advisory
services, which many characterize as box-ticking, one-size-fits-all exercises
mirroring the majority views among institutional investor clients,187 which are
themselves often laden with conflicts of interests.188 In theory, algorithms may
be equally good at that, if not better, but it is hard to understand how they could
do things in a different, more tailored and more granular way without obtaining
specific input from the institutional investor client using them, which institutions
other than the world’s largest would find burdensome and hence competitively
harmful.189
c. Active Investing and Shareholder Activism: Less or More?
Rational reticence is not a problem for institutional investors that are
overweighted on a given stock, that is, when they “own a greater share of the
specific company than [they] own of the market generally,”190 as is usually the
case for (truly) actively managed funds and activist funds.191
Active traders and activist investors are in fact among the main participants
in the dialogue between corporate boards and shareholders: active investors may
respond to unexpected negative information by selling the corporate stock unless
the company’s ongoing dialogue with them has laid the foundations for good
relations and trust long before difficulties emerge. Activist investors’ demands,
in turn, keep boards on their toes, prompting directors to assess the merits of
such demands, attempt to persuade the activists that their demands are
unjustified, and/or secure support from other shareholders against the activists.
Tech proponents predict lower returns for both investor types because of
the full transparency they envisage, which would reduce the likelihood of

186. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?,
59 EMORY L.J. 869 passim (2010) (finding that ISS is the most influential proxy advisor, with Glass Lewis
coming closely behind it).
187. See id. at 883–84.
188. Tao Li, Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Conflicts of Interest Within the Proxy Advisory Industry,
64 MGMT. SCI. 2951, 2969 (2016).
189. Proxy advisors provide tailored services only to their largest clients. Luca Enriques & Alessandro
Romano, Institutional Investor Voting Behavior: A Network Theory Perspective, 2019 U. ILL. L. R EV. 223, 237–
38 (2019). Machines could, of course, do the same, but the fact remains that they would either be developed by
proxy advisors themselves or by the few giant institutions whose size would justify their (nontrivial)
development costs.
190. Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited
Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2048 (1994).
191. See supra note 181 (regarding actively managed funds); see, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When
the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate
Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1885–1910 (2017) (describing activist hedge funds and their
governance-related strategies).
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profiting from informational advantages. If both strategies became less
profitable, fewer investors of this kind would have to be expected. That, in turn,
should reduce the need for board mediation.192
For the sake of argument, let us leave aside the fact that the full
transparency scenario is unrealistic.193 Even in a hypothetical full transparency
scenario, it would follow from the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox that there would
be room for active (informed) trading.194 Consider that even in a CorpTech
world, information gathering and processing requires some investment. If share
prices perfectly and constantly reflected all available information, those who
spent resources to obtain information would receive no compensation and hence
would have no incentive to invest in information gathering and processing to
begin with. Without active trading, however, prices would no longer reflect all
available information, which in turn would make it profitable for active traders
to come back to the market and push prices “back” to the levels justified by the
available information.
We can go one step further and argue that it is far from certain that less
active investing would follow the widespread adoption of CorpTech. We can
understand active investing as the outcome of an inequation with three values:
information costs (I), trading costs (T), and returns from trading (R). If R > I +
T, active investing will follow. Technology, by making big data analytics tools
widely available, may indeed reduce profit opportunities from informed trading
(resulting in a lower R). But at the same time, both information costs (I) and
trading costs (T) would go down: DLT (as a storage tool) and AI (as an analytical
tool) will reduce information costs, while one of DLT’s core applications will
be clearing and settlement, implying lower trading costs. If, due to technology,
I and T become lower than today, then more informed trading could result, even
where R is lower than today. All in all, similar to the present world we expect
an “equilibrium degree of disequilibrium,”195 with a varying degree of active
trading—at times more, at times less—to continue.
This insight can be transferred to activist strategies. Activist strategies are
the outcome of a similar inequation as above: if R > I + T + E, activism will

192. See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text.
193. See supra Part III.C.2.a. It is easily conceded that AI is bound to lower profits from active trading,
because it allows active investors to make better use of existing available information; it does so by unearthing
patterns and highlighting correlations that help devise trading strategies and ideas and thereby enhance market
efficiency. Share price efficiency itself yields greater managerial discipline, but, to a considerable extent, that is
mediated by internal governance mechanisms such as boards and there is no intuitive reason to expect that a
higher degree of market efficiency should make the current internal governance mechanisms redundant. See
Gordon, supra note 64, at 1541.
194. See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 passim (1980). Grossman and Stiglitz argued that a competitive equilibrium,
“defined as a situation in which prices are such that all arbitrage profits are eliminated,” is impossible “for then
those who arbitrage make no (private) return from their (privately) costly activity. Hence the assumptions that
all markets, including that for information, are always in equilibrium and always perfectly arbitraged are
inconsistent when arbitrage is costly.” Id. at 393.
195. Id.
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follow.196 Here, R stands for returns from activism while I and T are, again,
information and trading costs and E stands for engagement costs. If R, thanks to
technology, were the only variable to fall, then the outcome would be less
activism. However, DLTs, big data analytics, and AI should reduce I and T.197
Hence, even a lower R may still generate profits.
The important point here is that, as long as there is any gain to be made
from informed trading or activist strategies, with new technologies driving down
costs we may see more, rather than less, active trading, or activism, respectively.
If this is the case, technology would make the need for a mediating institution
like a board of directors even greater than it is today.
d. Shareholder Dialogue with Conflicted Managers Less Fruitful
If dialogue with and among shareholders reverted to being mediated by
managers, outcomes would be different, and arguably worse: to start with, some
ideas presented by shareholders would not find fertile ground when presented to
management. For instance, shareholders asking for the removal of the CEO,
proposing a control sale, or pressing against a CEO’s pet project that, in their
view, destroys corporate value, will receive, at best, a lukewarm response when
they contact the CEO. On the contrary, they might more easily sow the seeds of
doubt when meeting independent directors. Their mediation, in turn, may reduce
either the cost of implementing the change or the risk of escalation in case the
company resists the appeal for change.
In addition, in the absence of board involvement, information flows among
shareholders, as currently mediated to some degree by the companies’ boards,
may become less fluid. If shareholders fear that management is taking advantage
of the views they share with it, they may be less inclined to air them, preventing
the company from relaying such views to other shareholders. With less fluid
communications among shareholders, the risk of polarization of views among
shareholders would increase and uncompromising and suboptimal positions
would correspondingly be more likely to prevail.
2. IT Limitations
One could also imagine a world in which algorithms replace boards in their
mediating functions. For such a scenario to be realistic, it would have to be the
case that the relevant CorpTech is able to imitate the full variety of human
behavior, in an effort to accommodate various parties with antagonistic views

196. Cf. Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge
Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 61–62 (2011) (providing a simple model for predicting when activists will engage
with a given company).
197. While some phases of engagement could be automated (for example, the initial contact with issuers on
matters identified by applying big data analysis), the core of engagement activities cannot, given the social nature
of the interactions involved; no meaningful reduction in E can therefore be expected. See infra note 199 and
accompanying text.
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and to facilitate the emergence of value-creating solutions. That is highly
unlikely to be the case.198
Technology experimenting with adjudication functions does exist199 but is
limited to either non-complex adjudication tasks (including claims collection for
traffic violations, paying/denying insurance and public benefits) or supervisory
orders in time-sensitive situations (such as gas leaks, nuclear fall-out, and
intervention in algo-based trading systems).200 Neither of these settings present
similarities with the environment where board-style mediation tasks are
performed.
To be sure, technology will make progress and will possibly become able
to manage complex social interactions: Google’s virtual assistant scheduling
barber appointments is one prototypical example, with many more certain to
follow.201 In a distant future, technology may entertain “social” interactions with
humans. Nevertheless, the coding of mediating board functions will be
particularly challenging: while technology may be particularly good at juggling
a variety of conflicting interests (for example, in data terms, variables), in
corporate matters it is rarely certain which constituencies pursue which interests.
At the beginning of controversial processes, all constituencies demand the
maximum, use side demands to cloak their true motives, or remain silent,
according to the circumstances, in an effort to generate strategic advantages in
negotiations.
Given AI CorpTech’s dependency on data,202 where there is no (or in our
case, no reliable) data to process, technology cannot help. Human board
members spend significant time (through conversations and other forms of
human interaction) on identifying crucial and less crucial interests, in an effort
to pinpoint the crunch line for a brokered compromise among antagonistic
shareholder groups and/or between management and the shareholder base.203
The challenge lies in the dynamic nature of such interactions. Governance
mediation takes place within a highly volatile system involving multiple actors,
diverse interests, and a firm’s very future, which is, of course, uncertain. In
198. See Frey & Osborne, supra note 20, at 262 (predicting that machines will be unable to replicate social
intelligence tasks in “the next decade or two;” what will happen after that is, of course, anyone’s guess).
199. Note that algorithmic adjudication differs from algorithmic Big Data-driven legal predictions; the latter
have been developed to reach an impressive degree of accuracy. See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal
Prediction—Or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal
Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 928–47 (2013) (citing prediction results from e-discovery, securities
litigation, and U.S. Supreme Court cases).
200. See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the
Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1167–75 (2017) (describing and giving examples for automated
administrative decision-making in the U.S. context); Gregory Scopino, Do Automated Trading Systems Dream
of Manipulating the Price of Futures Contracts? Policing Markets for Improper Trading Practices by
Algorithmic Robots, 67 FLA. L. REV. 221 passim (2015) (discussing digital supervision of trading systems).
201. See Paresh Dave & Arjun Panchadar, Google Eases Tech Stress with App Controls, Table-Booking
Assistant, REUTERS (May 8, 2018, 11:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabet-developersidUSKBN1I92ME.
202. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.a.
203. On the complex dynamics of negotiations with activists, see, for example, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon
Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, Dancing with Activists, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 8, 21–34 (2020).
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short, this system is a complex one in the scientific meaning, that is, a system
with “a significant number of interconnected parts that as a whole tend to interact
in a nonlinear manner.”204 From a technological perspective: “[a]s the dynamics
of the system being modeled become more volatile, so too do the predictions of
that system’s behavior.”205 In plain language, AI-driven predictions, in such a
setting, are random.
D. INTERMEDIATE RESULTS: UTOPIA RECONSIDERED
Based on what we know today about technology and corporate governance,
the scenario of corporate board obsolescence is unrealistic. As we have shown
in this Subpart, corporate governance challenges will persist even in a techdominated environment, so long as human beings wield influence over the firm’s
assets. As ever, corporate governance will ultimately be about who controls
corporate assets and how much the interests of those in control deviate from
those of the shareholders. As a corollary, contrary to the tech proponents’ view,
technological changes are unlikely to trivialize the board’s core monitoring and
mediating functions.
Yet, in a CorpTech age, the focal point of corporate governance conflicts
will indeed change and is arguably changing already:206 one key question is
becoming who controls the CorpTech within the firm. Decisions such as whether
the firm develops its own algorithms internally and under which chain of
command, which algorithms are licensed for which purpose, which data pool is
analyzed, and so on, now affect the quality of a firm’s governance as never
before. If management is in control of those decisions, we expect it to choose
coders and technology designs catering to its own interests, which may not be
perfectly aligned with the interests of shareholders. On top comes the risk that,
in the transition to a CorpTech-dominated environment, insufficient
understanding of the limits of CorpTech and over-confidence in its promise may
even aggravate agency problems within firms.
Depending on how CorpTech governance itself is designed, the
implementation of CorpTech solutions may cut both ways: it can be instrumental
in either enhancing or reducing agency costs. Correspondingly, CorpTech is
bound to either reinforce the board’s monitoring role, by improving the factual
basis for human judgement-based decisions and the detection of compliance
failures, or weaken it, by feeding directors with management-friendly analytical
tools. The former will happen if human-populated boards exist that control the
CorpTech choice and application, while the latter is likely if boards are replaced
by, or disregard the risks associated with, CorpTech. To conclude, CorpTech by
itself will not ensure better governance, but requires a governance framework
ensuring that its benefits come to the fore, while associated risks are under
control.

204. Katz, supra note 199, at 959.
205. Id. at 953.
206. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
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This conclusion holds with one important caveat: if predictions, as per the
old saw, are difficult, especially about the future, predictions about technological
innovation and its impact are even harder to make. At some point in the distant
future, CorpTech may become so sophisticated as to be able to keep
management under control better than humans. If and when that will be the case,
however, no one can tell today.

IV. A GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR THE CORPTECH AGE
What are the elements of the governance framework that will ensure
CorpTech’s beneficial impact? In the following Subparts we lay out some
normative considerations and provide some ideas on how to shape board
governance in the CorpTech age.
A. PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION?
A focus on CorpTech governance is only justified if market mechanisms
do not already ensure that CorpTech serves shareholders’ interests. In fact, one
could counter that the natural solution to the new tech-centered dimension of
intracorporate conflicts of interest is the market itself, that is, competition among
suppliers of CorpTech products.207 This Subpart casts doubt on the idea that
product market competition can be sufficient to let us stop worrying and
unreservedly embrace CorpTech.
First of all, there are reasons to be skeptical about the likelihood of the
market for CorpTech solutions delivering products that are genuinely in line
with the interests of shareholders. For one, product market competition works
only where a sufficient number of suppliers of CorpTech systems offer services,
struggling for clients’ attention through innovation and product differentiation.
With the sector still being in its infancy, it is pure speculation whether one, a
handful, or many CorpTech providers will survive in the medium to long term.
Yet, if past trends are of any guidance, time and again long-term software market
dynamics yield a small number of dominant IT platforms.208 Given the network
effects and economies of scale inherent in data-driven applications, which
increase switching costs and entry barriers,209 a different equilibrium is unlikely
in the CorpTech market.
To be sure, even in a market dominated by a few firms, one or more among
them may start competing by building a pro-shareholder brand. Corporations’

207. See Bamberger, supra note 16, at 713 (arguing in favor of diversification of risk management systems
to counter implicit biases).
208. See generally TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES (2010)
(arguing that information markets tend to turn into monopolies until they are replaced by superior technology).
See also Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 716, 784–86 (2017) (detailing how
traditional antitrust law interpretation furthers the build-up of monopolies in platform markets); Aghion et al.,
supra note 61, at 32–33 (arguing that data access may act as an entry barrier for creating competing networks,
hence the incumbent’s platform prevails).
209. Khan, supra note 208, at 772–73, 785–86.
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use of CorpTech products with a pro-shareholder reputation could bring some
gains in the form of higher stock prices.
Consider, though, that a brand-building strategy is much more likely to pay
off for standardized software tools than for tailored, firm-specific ones. In fact,
the more firm-specific the CorpTech, the less credible the pro-shareholder signal
sent by choosing a given CorpTech application. That is because management
input for the development of the tailored code will be key. Correspondingly, the
greater the coder’s specific investments in the relationship with an individual
company, the weaker the signal of independence. For this reason, a brandbuilding strategy is unlikely to work wherever the CorpTech’s added value
comes from customization, as is arguably the case with most CorpTech
applications. In fact, no two firms are alike; software developed for one firm will
not work as well for others.
In addition, similar to what has traditionally happened with audit firms and
other gatekeepers, unless the governance of a firm’s (and its management’s)
relationship with the supplier is effectively taken care of, there is a risk of
collusion with managers, that is, a risk of deviation ex post from shareholders’
interests.210 Developing a reputation for producing good (shareholder-friendly)
CorpTech would arguably be even harder than developing a reputation for
providing good audit services, if only because there are, to date, no generally
accepted coding standards that outsiders could use to understand what the coders
have done. In addition, outside monitoring and review of algorithms is highly
problematic.211
The contractual governance point can be generalized to cast doubt on the
ailing effects of product market discipline: competitors will have to sell products
that the relevant decision-makers within corporations will find attractive. Unless
such decision-makers’ incentives are fully aligned with the interests of
shareholders, there is scope for suboptimal products to prevail on the market.
But if full alignment is ensured, there will be no need for CorpTech.
B.

BEST PRACTICES: EXPANDING
CORPTECH OVERSIGHT

THE

BOARD COMMITTEES’ REMIT

TO

Information technology has traditionally been outside the board of
directors’ remit: the selection and management of technological solutions has

210. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 15–47
(2006) (describing the failure of gatekeepers and their collusion with management in the early 2000s corporate
scandals).
211. See Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G.
Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 passim (2017) (arguing that research
on AI review is in its infancy and that disclosure of results does not allow review of the underlying algorithm);
see also Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 196–97, 202
(2017) (arguing that code review does not result in desirable outcomes since the biases lie in broader social
processes that cannot be countered by reviewing the code alone, but calling for code disclosure to let the public
review the code outcome).
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rather been, and still is, part of the executives’ domain.212 Banks represent an
important exception here: with the ever-growing use of algorithms in risk
management, banks increasingly ask their risk committees to review
technology-related risks.213
But even in non-financial corporations, where technology has typically
been part of the oversight functions of the compliance or audit committee,214
things are changing fast. With technology taking center stage both as a
managerial and a governance tool, and with boards currently being composed
mainly of individuals often lacking the competence to understand such
aspects,215 more systematic oversight of technology on the part of a
(independent) risk or audit committee is becoming more common.216
Importantly, the practice of having tech committees, sometimes separate
from risk management committees, sometimes as joint risk and technology
committees, is spreading out,217 with cyber-attacks and IT-related operational
risk representing their core focus on the technology side.218 To the best of our
212. See HÜTTER & RIEDL, supra note 162, at 11–12 (stating that Chief Information Officers (CIOs) either
belong to the top management team or a department reporting to top management); see also Sid L. Huff, P.
Michael Maher & Malcom C. Munro, Information Technology and the Board of Directors: Is There an IT
Attention Deficit?, 5 MIS Q. EXEC. 55 passim (2006) (stating that boards are focused on IT risks only and that
only half of the financial firms and none of the non-financial firms surveyed discuss regularly IT issues other
than IT risks) (arguing that the CIO’s IT vision for the company, the IT strategic plan, major IT application
decisions, IT leadership, IT functional structure, IT function effectiveness, and whether or not IT applications
provide competitive advantage deserve discussion in the boardroom).
213. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for Information
Technology Governance, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 313, 319 (2011). Morgan Stanley has
introduced a technology committee in 2015 that advises the board and management team on Big Data tools and
systems that control stock trading. Kim S. Nash, Morgan Stanley Board Pushes Emerging Area of Tech
Conference, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015, 4:21 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/03/26/morgan-stanleyboard-pushes-emerging-area-of-tech-governance/. Tech advisory boards are becoming common outside the
banking sector as well. See, e.g., Josh King, The Growth of Digital Advisory Boards, LINKEDIN (Jun. 2, 2016),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/growth-digital-advisory-boards-josh-king/ (“All types of firms, from start-ups
and growth companies to Fortune 500 businesses and even PE/advisory firms, are developing these advisory
boards.”).
214. Richard Nolan & F. Warren McFarlan, Information Technology and the Board of Directors, 83 HARV.
BUS. REV. 96, 101 (2005).
215. Elizabeth Valentine & Glenn Stewart, Director Competencies for Effective Enterprise Technology
Governance, in THE 24TH AUSTRALASIAN CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS 5 (2013),
https://eprints.qut.edu.au/63374/ (highlighting the need for boards to provide enterprise technology governance
oversight of technology-related strategy, investment and risk, and to be competent in doing so) (“[T]he gaps are
large between the stated importance of business technology, actual board involvement . . . [and] knowledge and
experience to effectively oversee technology strategy . . . .”); see also MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 119, at 48
(detailing that approximately 45% of directors claim to have neutral or no competence on digitization, 49% on
disruptive business models, and approximately 60% on cybersecurity in Exhibit 4).
216. See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 213, at 319.
217. See Bankewitz et al., supra note 19, at 65. As of 2011, special board committees dealing with tech and
cybersecurity were in place in less than 25% of organizations. Id. Bankewitz et al. expect that the “changing
board agenda based on the shifts in organizational threats and opportunities may as well affect the committee
structure of an organization,” resulting in a greater role for, and wider diffusion of, tech committees. Id.
218. Id. (“Main tasks of such a [tech] committee may be for instance to ratify that information systems
architecture will support the strategies of the company to validate the effective use of data security tools to
evaluate data breach response plans and to oversight the managements’ abilities to execute them.”); see also
Julia L. Higgs, Robert E. Pinsker, Thomas J. Smith & George R. Young, The Relationship Between Board-Level

94

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:55

knowledge, however, tech committees are not in the business of monitoring the
conflicts of interest inherent to CorpTech governance.219
An extension of tech committees’ remit (or the remit of other board
committees with the necessary tech knowledge in the ranks) to include
CorpTech governance/oversight would seem to be a natural evolution in a techaugmented governance framework.220 Their extended focus should be on
monitoring contract negotiations with coders, designing the governance of the
contractual relationship with the coders, reviewing the design settings of crucial
algorithms as well as, possibly, having a say on (internal) coders’ compensation.
As with any governance tool, a board committee in charge of CorpTech
oversight would be no silver bullet. Again, we can distinguish between
technological limitations and governance’s inherent traits. One considerable
challenge in terms of technological limitations is that, at least at the current stage
of IT development, ex post review of the functions, limits, and biases of an
algorithm is of limited effectiveness.221 Moreover, while independent directors
themselves can work better than shareholders as monitors of management,
including in overseeing management’s exercise of discretion when it comes to
CorpTech, they are bound to suffer themselves from information asymmetries
and imperfect incentives alignment.222
As a corollary, putting an independent (tech) committee in charge of
selecting CorpTech may sacrifice business efficiency in the name of conflict
monitoring. In fact, in modern corporations, business operations depend on the
efficiency of systems, while such efficiency depends, in turn, on accuracy as to
process details. Meanwhile, given the elusive boundaries between CorpTech and
operations IT,223 putting an independent (tech) committee in between
management and tech deployment could slow down information transfer from
management to coders. Oversight by an independent (tech) committee—rather
than replacing management with independent directors in the task of managing
a firm’s IT—seems to be a balanced solution.

Technology Committees and Reported Security Breaches, 30 J. INFO. SYS. 79, 79–83 (2016) (arguing that tech
committees are understood as part of the firm’s IT governance to signal the firm’s ability to detect and respond
to security breaches).
219. Cf. Martin Lipton, Spotlight on Boards, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 29, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/29/spotlight-on-boards-6/. While this widely circulated client alert
memorandum refers to oversight risks arising, inter alia, from technological developments as one of the items
boards are expected to focus on in 2020, oversight of CorpTech solutions is not mentioned as one such item. Id.
220. Cf. Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 102 (similarly suggesting the setup of a committee of
independent directors in charge of “data governance”).
221. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
222. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW
AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 166, at 275, 316–20, 327–31 (describing independent directors’ time constraints,
limited access to the relevant firm’s inside information, and skewed incentives, even after they started being
given stock-based compensation, and summarizing the available empirical evidence).
223. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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C. THE CASE AGAINST CORPTECH REGULATION
Does the prospectively pervasive role of CorpTech in listed companies’
governance warrant any changes in the statutory law (state or federal) of
corporations?
We are hesitant to suggest so (with one exception laid out in the next
Subpart, namely enhanced CorpTech governance disclosure). The main reason
for being cautious and recommending a wait-and-see approach is that corporate
governance practices are bound to change in the direction of sharpening the
focus on CorpTech issues.224 It would be premature, and contrary to a longstanding tradition in corporate governance reforms, to implement corporate
governance-focused changes in state corporate statutes, federal securities
regulation, or stock exchange listing rules before best practices have emerged
on the market. Furthermore, corporate governance practices are firm-specific.
Firms differ, for instance, in the extent to which they rely on their employees’
creativity, suppliers’ tailored inputs, intellectual property, and technology
integration, among other factors. The downside of any prescriptive rule would
be the risk of freezing much-needed experimentation in this area.
This is particularly true for a CorpTech licensing regime:225 any licensing
regime potentially limits innovation since innovators would focus on the
development of permissible products only. Besides general concerns aired
against public tech oversight,226 a licensing regime also raises the perennial issue
of who would administer these rules.
If authorization powers lie in public hands, we would expect supervisory
expertise and resources to be limited, resulting in slow-motion supervision,
while potential liability and the risk of reputational loss may skew incentives
towards a timid, anti-innovative supervisory approach.227 Novel regulatory
approaches, such as regulatory sandboxes,228 would deliver minor relief for
CorpTech supervision. These tools assist where the core issue is both the
innovators’ and supervisors’ shortage of expertise, time, and resources by
providing a temporary safe space for examining the impact of an invention under
almost real-time conditions and determining the adequate supervisory response.
A sandbox approach for CorpTech, however, would provide little comfort for
shareholders: it is far from clear that algorithms would show their true face in a
224. See supra Part IV.B.
225. As a form of private licensing, policymakers could impose liability insurance as a precondition for
doing business where technology makes most business decisions such as in self-driving corporations or
algorithmic entities. Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 112–13 (proposing a mandatory liability insurance
for “self-driving corporations”).
226. See Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 369, 370–
71 (2016) (stating that it has become difficult to define “what constitutes ‘normal’ economic activity and what
qualifies as actual or potential harm” for society, firms and its shareholders and stakeholders).
227. Cf. Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235, 248–49
(2019) (arguing that innovation poses a challenge for regulators since regulators are expected to warrant financial
innovation, simple rules and market integrity at the same time, with limited resources).
228. Steven Van Uytsel, Artifical Intelligence and Collusion: A Literature Overview, in ROBOTICS, AI AND
THE FUTURE OF LAW 155, 175–77 (Marcelo Corrales, Mark Fenwick & Nikolaus Forgó eds., 2018) (discussing
the testing of colluding algorithms in a sandbox).
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sandbox.229 And, of course, the “learning” in machine learning does not stop
with the final moment in the sandbox: any assessment achieved during the
sandbox period would soon be outdated.
If authorization powers lie, by way of indirect supervision, in private
hands, the usual question of who watches the watchers takes the foreground.
This question has been long and widely discussed, and rarely answered
convincingly, in the similar context of auditors and rating agencies.230 Second,
CorpTech licensing is compounded by an additional layer of IT complexity,
turning IT audit into an emerging research field.231 The difficulties with code
review are particularly pronounced for advanced machine-learning algorithms
that receive feedback from non-human sources, for instance the price data feeds
from stock and other markets. Technical means to review the function and
limitations of self-learning algorithms do not yet exist.232
D. ENHANCING CORPTECH-RELATED DISCLOSURES
Instead of product regulation, policymakers could require the disclosure of
the CorpTech code. The case for disclosure would rest on the assumption that
knowledgeable shareholders, market analysts, and traders would analyze the
disclosures and trade on the basis of their analysis until the share price fully
reflects the implications of those disclosures relative to the company’s
profitability.233 Anticipating market scrutiny, management would have an
incentive to choose good software. Applying this logic, external IT experts,
whether individually or as a group, could undertake such code reviews on an
experimental basis. The more experiments of this kind that are undertaken, the
greater the likelihood of imperfect CorpTech solutions being exposed as such.
In fact, in IT circles, crowdsourced testing has been acknowledged as a powerful
analytical tool for detecting code deficiencies.234
229. See ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE
ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 230–31 (2016) (arguing with respect to competition law that sandbox test results
finding collusion and non-collusion of algorithms are notoriously unreliable).
230. See, e.g., COFFEE, supra note 210, at 15–47 (2006) (describing the failure of gatekeepers and their
collusion with management in the early 2000s corporate scandals).
231. See Christian Sandvig, Kevin Hamilton, Karrie Karahalios & Cedric Langbort, Auditing Algorithms:
Research Methods for Detecting Discrimination on Internet Platforms 6–10 (May 22, 2014), http://social.cs.
uiuc.edu/papers/pdfs/ICA2014-Sandvig.pdf (providing an overview of audit methods and outlining their
deficiencies).
232. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. Code reviews are limited to experiments where certain data
feeds are provided to the algorithm, and the algorithm’s output is assessed. But these experiments are by no
means complete, nor can these experiments mimic real life conditions for enterprise software, especially if the
exercise is undertaken without access to all the firm’s and market data that feeds into the software. In order to
control risks stemming from the self-learning dimension of algorithms, IT coders tend to limit the data access
and processing functions of self-learning algorithms, thereby weakening one of the competitive advantages of
CorpTech vis-à-vis humans, which is that those algorithms consider all available data and correlations.
233. See generally Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711 (2006).
234. Niklas Leicht, Ivo Blohm & Jan Marco Leimeister, Leveraging the Power of the Crowd for Software
Testing, 34 IEEE SOFTWARE 62, 62–63 (2017) (arguing that crowdsourced testing replaces manual testing since
manual testing is becoming less economically viable and useful).
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However, code disclosure will likely stifle innovation since it facilitates, if
not encourages, the copying of the code; less investment in code development
would follow. Furthermore, code disclosure is of no use where little, if any, firmspecific data is available to crowd testers.235 Firms will not voluntarily disclose
the data they process in algorithms, as disclosure may harm their
competitiveness, contravene confidentiality duties, and/or infringe third party
privacy rights.
Given the increasing centrality of tech issues for corporate governance, one
contiguous area where a change in the law could help is the disclosure of listed
companies’ tech governance arrangements. As is the case with similar
disclosures, for instance on internal controls and executive compensation,236 the
dissemination of information about individual companies’ practices with regard
to CorpTech oversight may help issuers become aware of better practices and
further their adoption. The need to articulate CorpTech governance
arrangements in disclosure documents, not to mention the risk of securities
litigation regarding their contents, would also provide directors with the
incentives to adopt appropriate CorpTech governance arrangements.237 Where
disclosure shows that management and boards are lagging behind,
shareholders—possibly themselves assisted by CorpTech that monitors techrelated disclosures—may press for improvements.
Existing periodic disclosures on corporate governance arrangements could
thus be supplemented with additional explanations on, for instance, whether the
issuer has a tech committee (or whether one of the other existing committees
have CorpTech oversight functions), whether any of the board members are tech
experts, how compensation for the coders is determined, how the board oversees
code design, development, and upgrading, whether the board regularly engages
in the review of existing IT structure, and so on. This could be part of annual
disclosures mandated either by the Securities and Exchange Commission238 or
the stock exchange listing rules.239

CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that CorpTech will have a significant impact on how
corporate boards perform their functions: new technologies are in fact bound to

235. Any more limited disclosure allows management to argue that the deficiencies that the shareholders’
and/or IT expert groups’ analyses may reveal are due to “wrong” data used for the test or an incomplete
embedding of the test software into the firm’s operating system.
236. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2019) (requiring disclosures, respectively, on audit committee composition,
tasks and activities and on compensation committee, composition, tasks and functioning).
237. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections
upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 904 (2003) (highlighting the role of mandatory disclosures in ensuring
that directors fulfill their duty of care). We are grateful to Christopher Bruner for drawing our attention to this
point.
238. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2019) (requiring disclosure on a number of corporate governance
arrangements).
239. See, e.g., NYSE L ISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.09 (2009) (requiring companies to have and
disclose corporate governance guidelines and listing the items to be included therein).
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enhance boards’ effectiveness by improving the information collection and
processing tools available to them. But, as this Article has argued, CorpTech
will not replace boards.240 Neither will CorpTech significantly change what
boards do, namely monitoring managers and mediating between them and the
company’s shareholders and other stakeholders. That is because technology will
not itself solve the agency problems characterizing corporations. The core
insight of this Article is in fact that such agency problems cannot be coded away:
those in control of the CorpTech will (continue to) control the corporation and
therefore preserve their ability to engage in self-serving behavior.
As building blocks of a governance framework for the CorpTech Age, we
propose to tackle CorpTech manifestations of governance issues through rather
traditional means, namely CorpTech board committees and disclosure of tech
governance arrangements. These old-style, “analogue” tools, imperfect as they
may be, can reduce the risk that CorpTech actually exacerbates agency problems
within corporations by making it even easier for managers to pursue their own
agenda. Only if and when humans relinquish corporate control to machines, may
the problems at the core of corporate governance be solved, but by then humans
will have more pressing issues to worry about than corporate governance.

240. Cf. Curtis P. Langlotz, Will Artificial Intelligence Replace Radiologists?, 1 RADIOLOGY: A.I. 1, 1–2
(2019) (“‘Will AI replace radiologists?’ is the wrong question. The right answer is: Radiologists who use AI will
replace radiologists who don’t.”).

